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I. INTRODUCTION
May 26, 2011, marked the ten-year anniversary of the establishment of
the African Union, and with the sudden death of Muammar al Gaddafi, who
was instrumental in the creation of the African Union,1 the time is ripe to
fully re-assess the ability of the African Union to ensure state compliance
with the Constitutive Act of the African Union (Constitutive Act) and the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter). The
African continent has a long history of massive human rights abuses. Prior
to 2001, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was responsible for
ensuring that African states complied with international law and respected
the human rights of their citizens.2 Given the OAU’s many failures,
including its inability to stop or prevent human rights violations, member
states of the OAU elected to overhaul the OAU and establish the African
Union on May 26, 2001.3 Previous writings by legal scholars on the African
Union have generally concluded that the African Union, like its predecessor
the OAU, has been unable to protect human rights in Africa or ensure state
compliance with the democratic and human rights principles set forth in the
African Charter.4
This Article contributes to the body of scholarship on the effectiveness of
the African Union by analyzing the African Union’s response to the political
and humanitarian crises in Madagascar, Guinea-Conakry, Zimbabwe, Libya,
and Kenya from both a realist and institutionalist perspective on state
compliance with international law. This Article argues that while the
African Union’s handling of the crises in Madagascar and Guinea-Conakry
indicates that the African Union is successfully providing incentives for its
smaller and less powerful member states to comply with the Constitutive Act
and the African Charter, the African Union’s ultimate resolution of the crisis
in Zimbabwe and its feeble responses to the political turmoil in Libya and
Kenya signal that the African Union continues to be plagued by a number of
problems, including, but not limited to, the following: limited political will,
failure to timely and uniformly impose sanctions, state reporting failures, and
inadequately drafted governing instruments. This Article will propose a
number of solutions to these problems, such as revising the African Charter
1

Paul Reynolds, African Union Replaces Dictators’ Club, BBC NEWS (July 8, 2002, 11:23
GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/2115736.stm (identifying Gaddafi as instrumental in
a captioned photo).
2
Constitutive Act of the African Union, entered into force May 26, 2001, 2158 U.N.T.S.
3, 33 [hereinafter AU Constitutive Act].
3
Corinne A.A. Packer & Donald Rukare, The New African Union and Its Constitutive Act,
96 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 365, 374 (2002).
4
Id. at 377–78.
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to eliminate claw-back clauses, amending the Constitutive Act, revising the
protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council to remove the principle
of equitable regional representation and rotation, better utilizing the African
Union Commission on International Law, and revising the protocols
establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II introduces the institutionalist
and realist theories of state compliance with international law. Part III
establishes the applicable legal framework by addressing the history of the
African regional human rights system and critiques the provisions of both the
African Charter and the Constitutive Act. By using the realist and
institutionalist theories to review the African Union’s response to the
political crises in Madagascar and Guinea-Conakry, Part IV analyzes the
effectiveness of the African Union in ensuring state compliance with the
provisions of the African Charter and the Constitutive Act. Part V examines
the African Union’s paltry reaction to the political crises in Zimbabwe,
Libya, and Kenya from an institutionalist and realist perspective and
analyzes the African Union’s inability to ensure that these countries comply
with the principles contained in the African Charter and the Constitutive Act.
Part VI unveils the problems the African Union continues to face in light of
its response to the crises in Zimbabwe, Libya, and Kenya. Part VI also
proposes concrete legal solutions to enable the African Union to more
effectively protect human rights in Africa and obtain member state
compliance with the human rights and democratic principles set forth in the
Constitutive Act and the African Charter.
II. THEORIES OF STATE COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
While a number of individual theories provide a suitable basis for
analyzing state compliance with international law, this Article combines the
institutionalist and realist theories to ultimately produce a cohesive and
unique paradigm to evaluate the African Union’s efficacy in obtaining
member state compliance with the African Charter and Constitutive Act.
A. Institutionalist Perspective
The institutionalist theory of state compliance with international law
views states as rational actors that behave on the basis of self-interest.5
According to institutionalists, membership in a regional human rights
5

Catherine Powell, United States Human Rights Policy in the 21st Century in an Age of
Multilateralism, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 421, 425 (2002).
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system, which states join with the aim of setting a common standard of
behavior, positively impacts a state’s perception of its self-interest by
creating significant incentives to comply with the international rules and
norms established by the regional human rights system.6
Proponents of the institutionalist theory assert that the rules and norms
established by institutions will reform a state’s decision-making process,
thereby encouraging a state to cooperate by surrendering certain short-term
goals in order to reap greater benefits of long-term gains.7 Additionally,
according to institutionalists, human rights violations occur “when the
conditions supporting compliance are absent or weak, that is, when
international norms are ambiguous.”8 Thus, institutionalists believe that state
compliance with the norms and rules of a human rights regime will be
greatest in those regions of the world where human rights regimes are strong,
such as in Western Europe.9
Furthermore, institutionalists assert that state compliance with the norms
established by a human rights regime can occur in a number of ways:
[B]y rewarding states that develop reputations for adherence to
international rules; by creating greater interdependence
between states thereby raising the cost of cheating; by
increasing the amount of available information to ensure
effective monitoring of adherence and early warning of
cheating; and by reducing the transaction costs of individual
agreements, thereby making cooperation more profitable for
self-interested states.10
In essence, the rules and norms of a human rights regime increase the
likelihood of a state’s transformation from frequently cheating for its own
self-interest to instead choosing cooperation in pursuit of long-term gains. In
the human rights context, monitoring mechanisms may be established in the
founding documents of the human rights regime (e.g., state reporting
procedures). Alternatively, they may be established on an ad hoc basis to
monitor and resolve specific political and humanitarian crises in
noncompliant countries (e.g., international contact groups).11 Additionally,
6

See id. (explaining that human rights systems or institutions minimize the noncooperative element of self-interest called cheating).
7
Id. at 426.
8
Sonia Cardenas, Norm Collision: Explaining the Effects of International Human Rights
Pressure on State Behavior, 6 INT’L STUD. REV. 213, 220 (2004).
9
Id. at 217.
10
Powell, supra note 5, at 426–27.
11
U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Making Human Rights a
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institutionalists argue that institutions “can promote cooperation in the
absence of a common . . . or . . . formal govern[ment] . . . by providing ‘a
stable environment for mutually beneficial decision-making as they guide
and constrain behavior.’ ”12 International institutions, such as the African
Union, bestow upon participating members the ability to create long-term
relationships, effectually eliminating mere short-term relationships that are
void of incentives to cooperate. For instance, under the direction of the
African Union, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)
was established in an effort to promote democracy in Africa and increase
economic integration and peace and security among African countries.13 In
connection with the creation of NEPAD, the African Union also created a
peer review mechanism that utilizes principles of self-monitoring, mentoring,
and guidance in the hopes of promoting good governance and socioeconomic
integration in African countries.14 Moreover, institutionalists emphasize
“inducing, rather than persuading or coercing, decision makers to comply
with international norms as the best means of protecting and promoting
human rights.15 In fact, “[r]ather than applying punitive sanctions, advocates
of this liberal position assume that greater economic openness will spill over
into increasing political reform . . . [and that] trade provides greater
opportunities for societal contact and an exchange of democratic [and human
rights] ideas. . . .”16
B. Realist Perspective
The realist perspective assumes international anarchy and purports that a
state will comply with international law only when compliance is in the
state’s self-interest.17 Thus according to realists, a rational state actor will
Reality: The Human Rights Mechanisms (Feb. 2009), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Abo
utUs/IK_HR_mechanisms_En.pdf.
12
William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal Scholarship, 12 AM.
U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 227, 242 (1997) (quoting Duncan Snidal, Political Economy and
International Institutions, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 121, 127 (1996)).
13
See generally African Union, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development 16–21
(Oct. 2001), available at http://www.uneca.org/nepad/Media-Dialogue/NEPAD_Framework
_Document.pdf (outlining the purpose and goals of NEPAD).
14
Org. of African Unity Assembly of Heads of State & Gov’t, The New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD): The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), §§ 1–2, 4,
AHG/235(XXXVIII) Annex II. For a detailed discussion on the African peer review system,
see Okezie Chukwumerije, Peer Review and the Promotion of Good Governance in Africa, 32
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 49 (2006).
15
Cardenas, supra note 8, at 217.
16
Id.
17
MARKUS BURGSTALLER, THEORIES OF COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 96–99
(2005).
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not abide by a treaty or the norms and rules established by a human rights
regime when doing so would not be in the state’s self-interest. In fact,
realists question the efficacy of international institutions such as human
rights regimes and posit that individual states, not international institutions,
are the key actors in international relations.18 Further, traditional realists
argue that “a state commits an action because it advances its national interest
but it does not need to claim that the national interest itself serves to justify
international acts.”19
In contrast to the institutionalist theory, the underpinnings of the realist
theory derive from the notion that states are rationally seeking to increase
two vital components—power and security.20 According to realists, the
important factor influencing state compliance with international law is the
power of a state relative to the other states that are parties to a particular
human rights regime.21 Therefore, the extent to which a state’s behavior
conforms to international law mainly depends on a state’s political,
economic, and military power in comparison to its neighboring states or the
human rights regime, not on the norms and rules established by the
governing human rights regime.22
According to realists, “[w]eaker
governments ‘accept international obligations because they are compelled to
do so by great powers.’ ”23 Moreover, realists “expect human rights
violations to be pervasive, given that it is not in most states’ material
interests to attach sufficiently high costs to noncompliance.”24 Thus,
according to realists, military intervention and sanctions are often necessary
to coerce a recalcitrant state into compliance.25
It should be noted that, in general, the realist perspective focuses mainly
on the role of individual states in international politics rather than on the
actions of international institutions, such as human rights regimes.26
18
Jack Snyder, One World, Rival Theories, FOREIGN POL’Y, Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 59; see
also Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and
the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1832, 1842 (2002) (noting realists’ lack of concern for international organizations, which do
not impose constraints on hegemonic states).
19
BURGSTALLER, supra note 17, at 97.
20
See id. at 97–98 (describing realist theories that focus on security and power).
21
See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation
in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 221 (2000) (discussing the effect hegemonic power
dynamics have on human rights regimes).
22
BURGSTALLER, supra note 17, at 96.
23
Helfer, supra note 18, at 1842 (quoting Moravcsik, supra note 21, at 221).
24
Cardenas, supra note 8, at 219.
25
Tseming Yang, International Treaty Enforcement as a Public Good: Institutional
Deterrent Sanctions in International Environmental Agreements, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1131,
1139–40 (2006).
26
Snyder, supra note 18; see also Helfer, supra note 18, at 1895 (assessing realist theory).
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However, the concepts of state security, power, self-interest, coercion, and
sanctions, all of which underlie the realist theory, play an instrumental role in
understanding international politics and state compliance with international
law. As such, this Article will utilize the concepts underlying the realist
perspective—state security, power, self-interest, coercion, and sanctions—to
analyze the actions of the African Union and propose solutions to better aid
the African Union in obtaining state compliance with the African Charter and
Constitutive Act.
The evolution of the institutionalist and realist theories of state
compliance with international law has afforded scholars a potent tool for
analyzing international relations and determining the efficacy of regional
human rights systems. However, these theories are not immune from
criticism and neither theory alone can definitively and conclusively account
for all factors that may impact or determine state compliance with
international law. Therefore, this Article seeks to combine both the realist
and institutionalist theories to utilize a wider range of factors that may
predict member state compliance, and thereby, comprehensively determine
whether the African Union has successfully obtained member state
compliance with the African Charter and Constitutive Act.
III. AFRICAN REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND
CRITIQUE
Established in 1963, the OAU had as its main goal the elimination of
colonization in Africa and the promotion of unity and solidarity among
African states for the betterment of its peoples.27 Absent from the OAU
Charter, however, was an explicit statement of the OAU’s role in protecting
the human rights of the African citizenry.28 The absence of this provision
would lay the foundation for the OAU’s failure to prevent or stop the human
rights violations later committed by abusive African states and rebel fighters.
Of course, with the exception of a few international conventions adopted
prior to 1963—the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention
27
G. Aforka Nweke, The Organization of African Unity and Intra-African Functionalism,
489 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 133, 134, 138 (1987).
28
See Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39,
reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: BASIC DOCUMENTS AND
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 28 (M. Hamalengwa et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter OAU Charter].
It should be noted that the preamble of the OAU Charter affirmed the OAU’s commitment to
the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Universal Declaration), and Article II, Section 1(e) of the OAU Charter provided that
the OAU must promote international cooperation with due regard to the UN Charter and the
Universal Declaration. Id. at pmbl., art. 2, § 1(e). However, those were the only references to
the term “human rights” in the OAU Charter. See id.
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on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees—neither the United Nations
(UN) nor leading western countries had adopted many of the modern
international conventions and treaties that recognize and guarantee human
rights.29 In fact, most of the international conventions and international
human rights treaties recognized today were adopted after 1965.30 For
example, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination was adopted in 1965, and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights was adopted in 1966.31 Therefore,
one cannot fault the OAU’s thirty-two founding countries32 for failing to
specifically include a human rights provision in the OAU Charter when most
Western countries and the UN were not primarily focused on the protection
of human rights at that time. Moreover, at the time of the OAU’s creation,
its founding countries may have viewed colonialism and apartheid in South
Africa as the most pressing human rights concerns in Africa. Thus, while the
OAU had many failures, which will be discussed later in this section, the
OAU arguably achieved success in two main areas: (a) the elimination of
colonization in Africa and (b) the elimination of apartheid in South Africa.
Article II, Section 1(d) of the OAU Charter provided that a preeminent
objective of the organization was “to eradicate all forms of colonialism from
Africa.”33 Undoubtedly, the OAU successfully achieved this goal. The
organization not only took advantage of Cold War tensions, but also
provided diplomatic support to African countries and galvanized the world

29
The United Nations General Assembly proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights on December 10, 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)
A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). The Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
on December 9, 1948. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/260(III) (Dec. 9, 1948). The Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on
July 28, 1951. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150.
30
See International Law, OFF. UN HIGH COMMISSIONER ON HUM. RTS., http://www2.ohchr.
org/english/law/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2012).
31
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
was adopted on December 21, 1965. Id. The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights was adopted on December 16, 1966. Id. The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights was adopted on December 16, 1966. Id. The Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women was adopted on December 18,
1979. Id.
32
S. Afr. Dep’t of Int’l Relations & Cooperation, Organization of African Unity
(OAU)/African Union (AU), INT’L REL. & COOPERATION, http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multil
ateral/Africa/oau.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2012).
33
OAU Charter, supra note 28, art. 2, § 1(d).
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community and the UN into actions aimed at ending colonialism.34 For
example, the OAU established a sanctions bureau to further implement
economic boycotts of African states controlled by European powers.35 It also
created a coordinating committee of African states to assist liberation
movements in colonial states.36 As a result of the OAU’s diplomacy, along
with the wars fought by the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique in
Mozambique and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola in
Angola, Portugal was forced to grant independence to Mozambique in 1974
and to Angola in 1975.37 There were only thirty-two independent African
states when the OAU was founded in 1963.38 However, due to the
organization’s multifaceted efforts, many more African states were able to
gain independence, and the OAU was composed of fifty-three independent
African states by its overhaul in 2001.39
The OAU also played a critical role in ending apartheid in South Africa.
Through its many efforts, the African Union successfully excluded South
Africa from international organizations such as the ILO, UNESCO, FIFA,
the International Olympic Movement, and most notably, the UN General
Assembly.40 In 1977 the OAU, along with the UN, organized an
antiapartheid world conference; there, with approximately 112 governments
participating, the Lagos Declaration for Action Against Apartheid was
adopted.41 Further, the OAU successfully lobbied the UN and its member
states to adopt sanctions against South Africa.42 Although the people of
South Africa played a central role in the destruction of apartheid, the OAU,
through its diplomatic efforts, figured significantly in the eradication of
apartheid.
Despite the OAU’s success in eliminating colonialism in Africa and
apartheid in South Africa, on the whole, the OAU generally failed to fully
shield African peoples from abusive states, and in fact, many have argued
that the OAU “exist[ed] only for the protection of African Heads of State.”43
34

See generally GEORGE WILLIAM MUGWANYA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: ENHANCING
HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH THE AFRICAN REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 173–81 (2003)
(describing the success of the OAU).
35
Godfrey L. Binaisa, Organization of African Unity and Decolonization: Present and
Future Trends, 432 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 52, 58 (1977).
36
Id. at 59.
37
MUGWANYA, supra note 34, at 174–75.
38
Id. at 174.
39
AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2.
40
MUGWANYA, supra note 34, at 175.
41
Id. at 177.
42
Id. at 177–78.
43
Yassin El-Ayouty, An OAU for the Future: An Assessment, in THE ORGANIZATION OF
AFRICAN UNITY AFTER THIRTY YEARS 179, 179 (Yassin El-Ayouty ed., 1994).
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The inability of the OAU to address human rights needs was due in part to
abuse of the noninterference clause found in Article III, Section 2 of the
OAU Charter.44 This clause, which promoted noninterference in the internal
affairs of states as a major principle, was used by heads of state to shield
their human rights abuses from outside interference.45 Once a state labeled
its actions or those of its citizens as “internal affairs,” the OAU was
powerless to intervene.46 A 1979 statement by the then President of GuineaConakry, Sekou Toure, aptly illustrates the problem. President Toure
claimed that “the OAU was not ‘a tribunal which could sit in judgement on
any member state’s internal affairs.’ ”47 This belief, it seems, was
widespread among many OAU heads of state, and as a result, the
organization was unable to hold recalcitrant states accountable for human
rights violations. For example, in 1963, Burundi pleaded with the OAU to
prevent and stop the massacre of Tutsis, but the organization failed to act,
and in 1972 and 1973, the OAU failed to prevent the murder of thousands of
Hutus in Burundi.48 The OAU again sat dormant as Equatorial Guinea’s then
president, Francisco Marcias Nguema, committed human rights atrocities
that eventually forced almost 1.5 million Equatorial Guineans to flee the
country.49 Moreover, the OAU proved unable to prevent or end the massacre
of over 300,000 Ugandans under Idi Amin’s deadly eight-year rule.50 Even
after the OAU adopted the African Charter, the OAU continued to prove
incapable of protecting the human rights of African peoples, and it failed to
obtain member state compliance with the human rights principles contained
in the African Charter. For example in 1994, the OAU could not thwart the
massacre of approximately 800,000 Rwandan Tutsi and moderate Hutu.51
Similarly, the OAU failed to prevent the reported genocides that occurred in
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi in 1996.52

44

MUGWANYA, supra note 34, at 182.
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.; see also U.O. Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 77
AM. J. INT’L L. 902, 902–03 (1983) (noting the limited authority members imposed upon
themselves).
48
MUGWANYA, supra note 34, at 182. The OAU generally failed to intervene in human
rights abuses, as most African leaders believed that foreign criticism of their actions violated
the non-interference clause contained in the OAU Charter. Id.
49
Olusola Ojo & Amadu Sesay, The O.A.U. and Human Rights: Prospects for the 1980s
and Beyond, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 89, 92 (1986).
50
AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1979, at 37–38 (Amnesty Int’l
Publ’ns 1979).
51
MUGWANYA, supra note 34, at 55.
52
Id.
45
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As a result of the many failures of the OAU, and in an effort to mimic the
success of the European Union (EU), the member states of the OAU, with
the support of Gaddafi, elected to replace the OAU with the African Union in
2000.53 Gaddafi submitted a proposal for the creation of an African Union as
early as 1999 and he re-affirmed this idea at an African summit meeting in
Togo in 2000.54 It should be noted, however, that while many have credited
Gaddafi with the creation of the African Union, evidence suggests that there
were other African leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah, who advocated for the
creation of the African Union as early as the 1960s.55
The African Union was created to ultimately fulfill many of the goals of
the OAU. As such, the African Union has incorporated many of the
principles and purposes previously stated in the OAU Charter. Some of
these inherited objectives include achieving unity and solidarity between
African peoples, defending sovereignty and territorial integrity of member
states, promoting and defending common African positions, encouraging
international cooperation, and having due regard for the UN Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.56
The African Union has also retained many of the organs of the OAU. In
some instances the names of the bodies or institutions were changed, but
nonetheless, their functions have remained the same. For example, as a
replacement to the Office of the Secretary General, the African Union
established the Commission of the Union and the Office of the Chairman.57
The African Union has preserved the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government of the Union (Assembly) as the supreme organ of the union,58
with most powers of the Assembly specifically mandated in the Constitutive
Act. Article 9 of the Constitutive Act provides that the Assembly may direct
the executive council on the management of wars and conflicts, monitor the

53

See Lome Declaration, AHG/Decl.2(XXXVI) (July 12, 2000) (recording considerations
that lead to support for the AU model); Transition from the OAU to the African Union: Design
of the African Union, AFR. UNION SUMMIT, http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/background/oau_
to_au.htm (last updated July 2, 2002) (noting intent to mimic the EU).
54
See Lome Declaration, supra note 53 (declaring support for an African Union); see also
Sirte Declaration, EAHG/Draft/Decl.(IV) Rev. 1 (Sept. 9, 1999) (recording decisions based on
Gaddafi’s proposals including the decision to establish an African Union).
55
Tiyanjana Maluwa, The Constitutive Act of the African Union and Institution-Building in
Postcolonial Africa, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 157, 161 (2003).
56
Compare AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 3, with OAU Charter, supra note 28,
art. 2.
57
Compare AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 20, with OAU Charter, supra note 28,
art. 16.
58
Packer & Rukare, supra note 3, at 375.
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implementation of policies and compliance by member states, and determine
the common policies of the African Union.59
A. Constitutive Act
Perhaps the most notable norm change under the African Union is the
newly placed restriction on the OAU’s noninterference clause. Article 4(h)
of the Constitutive Act now limits a state’s ability to abuse the
noninterference clause by permitting the African Union to intervene in the
internal affairs of a member state in “grave circumstances, namely[ ] war
crimes, genocide[,] and crimes against humanity.”60 Theoretically then,
heads of state can no longer use the noninterference clause as a shield against
accountability for human rights violations. Additionally, Articles 4(o) and
4(p) of the Constitutive Act indicate that the African Union is obligated to
condemn and reject unconstitutional changes of government and political
assassinations.61 Similarly, Article 3(g) of the Constitutive Act provides that
the African Union must “promote democratic principles and institutions,
popular participation and good governance.”62 Article 30 of the Constitutive
Act provides that states that come to power through unconstitutional means
will have their membership in the African Union suspended.63 Moreover,
Article 23 of the Constitutive Act permits the African Union to impose
appropriate sanctions, including political and economic sanctions, in the
event that a member state fails to comply with the decisions and policies of
the African Union as determined by the Assembly.64 In accordance with
Section 5(2) of the Constitutive Act, the African Union established the Peace
and Security Council of the African Union (Peace and Security Council) via
the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council
of the African Union (Council Protocol).65 The Peace and Security Council
is primarily responsible for the peaceful resolution of African conflicts and
one of its goals is to ensure the protection of human rights in Africa.66 Part
VI of this Article will critique certain provisions of the Council Protocol and
will propose amendments to the Council Protocol to ensure state compliance
with the democratic principles of the Constitutive Act.
59

AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 9.
Id. art. 4(h).
61
Id. arts. 4(o)–4(p).
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Id. art. 3(g).
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Id. art. 30.
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Id. art. 23.
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Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union, July 9, 2002, http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/organs/psc/Protocol_peace%20and%2
0security.pdf [hereinafter Council Protocol].
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Id. arts. 2, 3(f).
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There are a number of provisions contained in the Constitutive Act that
should be revised to more effectively ensure state compliance with the
principles contained in the Constitutive Act and African Charter. First,
Article 6, Section 3 of the Constitutive Act provides that the Assembly need
only convene once per year; however, upon the request of a member state
and two-thirds majority approval of the member states, the Assembly must
meet in an extraordinary session.67 The Assembly is the supreme organ of
the African Union and is responsible for monitoring the implementation of
the principles of the Constitutive Act and the decisions of the African
Union.68 Moreover, the Assembly has the power to suspend states that come
to power through unconstitutional means.69 Additionally, Article 7 of the
Council Protocol provides that the Peace and Security Council has the power
to recommend intervention by the Assembly pursuant to Article 4(h) of the
Constitutive Act,70 which permits the Assembly to intervene in a country in
the event of crimes against humanity and grave circumstances.71 Given the
frequency of political crises in Africa and the Assembly’s main role in the
African Union, in conjunction with its extensive powers, the Assembly
should be required to meet and address issues regarding compliance more
than once per year.
In practice, the Assembly generally meets at least twice per year.72
Although the Peace and Security Council is authorized to meet as frequently
as may be required and already plays an instrumental role in resolving
African conflicts, the Assembly is the head of the African Union and is the
organ best equipped to exercise the powers granted under the Constitutive
Act. In fact, once the Peace and Security Council renders a decision or
provides a recommendation, the Assembly then has the power to express its
support for the implementation of these decisions and recommendations, a
fact that may have additional benefits for implementation. For example, on
October 20, 2011, the Peace and Security Council authorized the creation of
an AU Liaison Office in Libya to address the Libyan crisis.73 However, the
next scheduled meeting of the Assembly was not until January 30, 2012, and
it was at this meeting that the Assembly expressed its support of the Peace
67

AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 6(3).
Id. arts. 6, 9.
69
Id. art. 30.
70
Council Protocol, supra note 65, art. 7(e).
71
AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 4(h).
72
See id. arts. 10(2), 13(2) (establishing the Executive Council, which meets twice annually
and reports directly to the Assembly).
73
African Union, Communiqué of the 297th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council on
Its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa, ¶ 5, Doc.
PSC/PR/COMM/2.(CCXCVII) (Oct. 20, 2011).
68
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and Security Council’s recommendation by requesting that the African
Union Commission accelerate the process of establishing an AU Liaison
Office in Libya to monitor the situation in Libya.74 Thus, despite the
meetings of the Peace and Security Council, the Assembly should meet more
frequently, at the very least to more expediently express official support for
the decisions of the Peace and Security Council.75
In contrast to the provisions of the Constitutive Act, which obligate the
Assembly to meet only once per year and require a two-thirds majority in
order to hold an extraordinary session of the Assembly,76 Article 237 of the
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) provides that the Council of the EU must meet whenever
convened by the president on his own initiative or at the request of one of its
members or the European Commission.77 Moreover, Article 15 of the
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (EU Treaty) provides
that members of the European Council, another EU organ, must meet at least
twice every six months to discuss the political priorities of the EU.78 In order
to ensure that the Assembly meets frequently enough to timely respond to
political crises, Article 6, Section 3 of the Constitutive Act should be revised
to mimic the provisions contained in Article 237 of the TFEU, Article 15 of
the EU Treaty, or both. However, unlike the African Union, the EU is well
funded. Thus, one must acknowledge the logistical difficulties, including
increased financial costs that the African Union may face due to more
frequent meetings of the Assembly. Given the frequency of political and
humanitarian crises in Africa (Guinea-Bissau and Mali being the most
recent79), such increased costs may be insignificant and well incurred in light
of the African Union’s long-term goals of protecting human rights and
increasing political stability and democracy in Africa.
74
Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Report of the Peace and Security
Council on Its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa, ¶ 4, Doc.
Assembly/AU/6(XVIII) (Jan. 2012).
75
In order to facilitate a quick and timely response to ongoing crises, the Constitutive Act
should not only be amended to require more frequent Assembly meetings, but also to remove
the two-thirds majority requirement imposed on approval of extraordinary sessions. AU
Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 6(3).
76
Id.
77
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 237,
May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
78
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 15, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J.
(C 115) 13.
79
Mali: UN Calls for Immediate Action to Avert Humanitarian Disaster, UN NEWS CENTRE
(July 26, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42561&Cr=+mali+&Cr1=
#.UEuXiWgyiyM; Unity, Common Purpose Vital to Resolve Guinea-Bissau Political Crisis –
UN Officials, UN NEWS CENTRE (July 26, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?Ne
wsID-42572&Cr-bissau&Crl=#.UEuUqmgyiyM.
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Second, Article 6, Section 4 of the Constitutive Act provides that “[t]he
Office of the [Chairperson] of the Assembly shall be held for a period of one
year . . . after consultations among Member States.”80 The Constitutive Act
contains no guidance regarding the standards that should be used to elect the
chairperson of the Assembly. President Boni Yayi of Benin was recently
elected to serve as the chairperson of the Assembly.81 However, prior to
President Boni’s election, President Mbasogo, long-ruling dictator of
Equatorial Guinea, served as chairperson.82 Similarly, Gaddafi, the former
dictator of Libya, also previously served as chairperson of the Assembly.83
To prevent the election of dictators who fail to respect human rights and
democracy, Article 6, Section 4 of the Constitutive Act should be revised to
specifically provide that the office of chairperson of the Assembly shall be
held only by heads of state with a consistent track record of promoting
democracy and human rights in their respective countries. Moreover, from
an institutionalist perspective, human rights violations occur when the norms
of the human rights regime are ambiguous.84 The chairman of the supreme
organ of the African Union must be ready to lead by example, thereby
signaling to member states clear norms regarding the protection of human
rights and the promotion of democracy.
Third, although Article 7 of the Constitutive Act provides some guidance
regarding the decisions of the Assembly, it fails to impose a timeliness
requirement on the Assembly’s issuance and communication of its decisions.
Article 7, Section 1 of the Constitutive Act provides that the Assembly must
“take its decisions by consensus or, failing which, by a two-thirds majority of
the Member States . . . . However, procedural matters, including the question
of whether a matter is one of procedure or not, shall be decided by a simple
majority.”85 Given the African Union’s slow and meager response to the
political crises in Libya and Kenya (discussed in detail in Part V of this
Article), there needs to be some provision in the Constitutive Act whereby
the Assembly is required to timely make and convey its decisions.
Moreover, Article 59 of the African Charter provides that all measures
adopted by the African Commission “shall remain confidential until such
time as the Assembly” authorizes the dissemination of such measures.86
80

AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 6(4).
African Union Comm’n, African Leaders Look to the Future with Hope and Optimism,
THE CHAIRPERSON’S MONTH, Feb. 2012, at 1, 2.
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Id.
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CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD & JIM ZANOTTI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33142, LIBYA:
BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 7 (2011).
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Cardenas, supra note 8, at 220.
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AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 7(1).
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African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 59, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3
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Thus, the Assembly’s lack of timeliness impacts not only decisions made by
the Assembly but also decisions rendered by the African Commission. As
such, Article 7, Section 1 of the Constitutive Act should be amended to
provide that the Assembly must make its decisions in a timely manner and
must communicate its decisions within ten days of reaching a consensus or,
failing that, a two-third majority of member states.
Fourth, while Article 14, Section 1(b) of the Constitutive Act establishes
a committee on monetary and financial affairs,87 absent from the Constitutive
Act is a provision which directly addresses the budget and financing for the
organs of the African Union.88 From a realist perspective, the extent to
which a state will comply with the norms of a human rights regime depends
on the power of the state in comparison to the political and economic power
of the human rights regime.89 Thus, the African Union must have the
economic power to pressure recalcitrant states to comply with the principles
of the African Charter and Constitutive Act. Article 23, Section 1 of the
Constitutive Act provides that member states that default on their payment
obligations to the African Union may be denied “the right to speak at
meetings, to vote, . . . or to present candidates for any position or post within
the [African] Union.”90 However, in practice it appears that either the
African Union has been inconsistent at utilizing Article 23, Section 1 to force
member states to meet their financial obligations to the African Union, or the
suspension of member benefits is not an effective sanctioning tool to
engender compliance with respect to paying membership dues. If the latter is
true, additional methods of enforcement may be needed in order to force
member states to pay their membership dues. As recently as July 1, 2011,
the African Union has acknowledged that it has continued to face budgeting
and financial issues due to member states’ failure to pay their dues.91 It has
been reported that Gaddafi paid membership dues on behalf of a number of
African states that were delinquent in their financial obligations to the

rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986 [hereinafter African Charter].
87
AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 14(1)(b). Additionally, Article 19 of the
Constitutive Act establishes certain financial institutions. Id. art. 19.
88
While a number of articles have discussed the lack of budgetary provisions in the
Constitutive Act (see, e.g., Packer & Rukare, supra note 3, at 377), this Article contributes to
this discussion by addressing the need for the inclusion of budgetary and financing rules in the
Constitutive Act from a realist and institutionalist perspective and contrasts the provisions of
the Constitutive Act with those of the European Union.
89
See discussion supra Part II.B.
90
AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 23(1).
91
Assembly of the African Union, 17th Sess., June 30–July 1, 2011, Decision Alternative
Sources of Financing the African Union, ¶ 3, Doc. EX.CL/656(XIX) [hereinafter Decision on
Financing].

92

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 41:75

African Union.92 Despite Gaddafi’s payment of membership dues for other
member states, the African Union continued to struggle with budgetary
issues.93 With Gaddafi’s death it is unlikely that these states will continue to
receive aid from Libya in paying membership dues to the African Union.
Moreover, in contrast to the Constitutive Act, which although modeled
after the EU fails to provide details on budgetary issues, Part Six, Title II of
the TFEU specifically addresses financing and budgeting issues in detail.
For example, Article 310 of Title II of the TFEU provides that “[a]ll items of
revenue and expenditure of the [EU] shall be included in estimates to be
drawn up for each financial year and [must] be shown in the budget,” and
that “the revenue and expenditure shown in the budget must be in balance.”94
Further, institutionalists argue that vague or unclear norms lead to state
noncompliance and human rights violations.95 The African Union does not
file an annual report, lacks an independent audit authority, and the details of
the annual budget are not publicly disclosed—in contrast to the many
financial disclosures made by other international organizations such as the
UN and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).96
The African Union must amend the Constitutive Act to ensure that its
founding document clearly establishes the rules and norms regarding not
only general financing and budgeting issues, but also member state financing
obligations. Additionally, the African Union must adopt measures to
improve financial transparency in its operations.
Fifth, Article 23, Section 2 of the Constitutive Act should be revised to
clearly provide for the imposition of political and economic sanctions in the
event of a violation of the human rights and democratic principles contained
92
Faith Karimi, Gadhafi's Legacy in Africa: ‘Madman or God?,’ CNN, Oct. 5, 2011, http://ar
ticles.cnn.com/2011-10-05/africa/world_africa_africa-gadhafi-legacy_1_moammar-gadhafi-afric
an-union-mosque?_s=PM:AFRICA; see also Wongai Zhangazha, Gaddafi Missed by AU
Member States, NEWS DAY (Mar. 10, 2012), http://www.newsday.co.zw/2012/03/10/2012-03-10
-gaddafi-missed-by-au-member-states/.
93
See Decision on Financing, supra note 91 (noting continued budgetary problems as late
as July 2011).
94
TFEU, supra note 77, art. 310.
95
Cardenas, supra note 8.
96
Brett D. Schaefer & Morgan Lorraine Roach, African Union: Transparency and
Accountability Needed, ISSUE BRIEF No. 3535 (Heritage Foundation, Wash. D.C.), Mar. 8,
2012, at 2; see also Admin. & Fin. Dep’t, Finance Directorate, ECOWAS, http://www.comm.ec
owas.int/dept/stand.php?id=c_c4_brief&lang=en (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (noting the Finance
Committee’s responsibility for annual audits and disseminating financial information of the
Commission). It should be noted that the African Union does provide information on how its
funds will be allocated among the different organs. Exec. Council of the African Union,
Decision on the Budget of the African Union for the 2013 Financial Year, Doc.
EX.CL/721(XXI) (July 2010), available at http://www.au.int/en/content/addis-ababa-09-13-july
-2012-executive-council-twenty-first-ordinary-session.

2012]

THEORIES OF STATE COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW

93

in the Constitutive Act, the African Charter, or any other convention,
protocol, or instrument adopted by the African Union. Currently, Article 23,
Section 2 of the Constitutive Act provides that “any Member State that fails
to comply with the decisions and policies of the [African] Union may be
subject to economic” and political sanctions.97 The term policies is not
defined in the Constitutive Act. Thus, it is unclear as to whether polices may
be deemed to include the democratic and human rights principles referenced
in the Constitutive Act, the African Charter, or other instruments such as the
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance which contains
expansive provisions regarding unconstitutional changes in government as
discussed in Part VI.B of this Article. In practice, it appears that the African
Union has either interpreted the term policies to include violations of the
African Charter or rendered sanctions after a “decision” has been made by
the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly.98 However, from an
institutionalist perspective, norm ambiguity leads to human rights violations
and clear norms can bolster the strength and efficacy of a human rights
regime.99 Therefore, Article 23 should be revised to clearly indicate that
economic and political sanctions will be automatically issued not only for a
state’s failure to comply with the decisions and policies of the African
Union, but also for violations of the democratic and human rights principles
contained in any instrument adopted by the African Union, including but not
limited to, the African Charter and the African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Governance. Additionally, Article 30 of the Constitutive Act
should be revised to provide, not only that a state’s membership in the
African Union be suspended if the state comes to power through
unconstitutional means, but also that the state will automatically face
economic and political sanctions. Moreover, as discussed in Part VI.A of this
Article, the African Union has repeatedly failed to impose sanctions on
recalcitrant states in a timely manner. Thus, from a realist perspective, in
order to pressure states to comply with the democratic and human rights
principles of the African Charter and Constitutive Act, Article 23 and
Article 30 of the Constitutive Act should be revised to provide that the
Assembly must issue sanctions no later than thirty days after an
unconstitutional change in government, as defined in the African Charter on
97

AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 23(2).
See African Union, Communiqué of the 216th Meeting of the Peace and Security
Council, ¶ 8, Doc. PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCXVI) (Feb. 19, 2010) (threatening sanctions on AU
member states involved in unconstitutional government changes); African Union,
Communiqué of the 221st Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, ¶¶ 2–4, Doc.
PSC/PR/COMM.(CCXXI) (Mar. 17, 2010) (imposing sanctions based on failure of AU
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Democracy, Elections and Governance.100 Part VI.A of this Article provides
a detailed discussion regarding the efficacy of sanctions.
B. African Charter
The newly created African Union retained the African Charter, which was
adopted, by member states of the OAU in 1981.101 The African Charter
recognizes a broad array of fundamental human rights of both individuals
and groups. For example, Article 3 provides that “[e]very individual shall be
equal under the law” and is entitled to equal protection under the law.102
Article 4 contains a broad recognition of respect for human life and the
integrity of a person and further provides that no person shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his right to life.103 Article 10 provides for the right of free
association,104 while Article 13 provides that every individual has “the right
to participate freely in the government of his [or her] country.”105 Article 23
of the African Charter provides that an individual is entitled to international
and national peace and security,106 and Article 30 establishes the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission).107 The
African Commission is responsible for promoting and protecting the human
rights principles contained in the African Charter.108 Pursuant to Article 42,
Section 2 of the African Charter, the African Commission has established
rules of procedure, which govern its operations.109 As discussed in detail
below, despite the many fundamental human rights guaranteed by the
African Charter, it contains a number of claw-back clauses and fails to
include a specific right to vote. Moreover, certain rules of procedure adopted
100

An unconstitutional change in government is defined as (i) a military “coup d’Etat
against a democratically elected government”; (ii) “an intervention by mercenaries to replace
a democratically elected government”; (iii) a “replacement of a democratically elected
government by armed [dissident groups] or [rebel movements]”; (iv ) the “refusal by an
incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party . . . after free, fair and regular
elections”; or (v) “[a]ny amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which
is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government.” African Charter on
Democracy, Elections and Governance art. 23, entered into force Feb. 15, 2012 [hereinafter
Democratic Charter], available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/te
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102
African Charter, supra note 86, art. 3.
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by the African Commission may impede the African Union’s ability to
obtain state compliance as discussed in Part VI.C of this Article.
Claw-back clauses permit states to restrict the rights established by the
African Charter. For example, Article 8 of the African Charter provides for
the freedom of conscience, and the free practice of religion; however, these
rights are subject to “law and order.”110 Article 9 of the African Charter
grants every individual the right to express and disseminate opinions,
provided that such opinions are “within the law.”111 Article 12 of the African
Charter guarantees each individual the right to leave any country, including
his or her own, and to return to his or her country; however, this right is
subject to restrictions established by African states for the protection of
“national security, law and order, public health or morality.”112 Similarly,
although Article 14 guarantees the right to property, this right “may only be
encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the
community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws”
established by African states.113 In short, the claw-back clauses allow
African governments to remove or restrict the human rights established by
the African Charter.
The African Commission has indicated that it will take an expansive
approach, turning to international human rights law when interpreting
African Charter provisions, including the claw-back clauses.114 That is, the
African Commission has stated that the claw-back clauses must be
interpreted in a manner that is consistent with international law and the
protection of human rights. Nevertheless, the existence of the claw-back
clauses allows heads of state to justify human rights violations through the
use of state law, and it may signal to recalcitrant member states that the
African Commission “condone[s] infringements of human rights norms as
long as it is done through domestic law.”115 Therefore, there is a pressing
need for the African Union to revise the African Charter to remove the clawback clauses.
For example, in a 1988 case the African Commission noted that the
Government of Zambia incorrectly relied on the claw-back clause of Article
12(2) of the African Charter when the government blocked a number of
individuals from returning to Zambia.116 The African Commission stated that
110
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the claw-back clauses in the African Charter should not be used to give
credence to violations of the human rights principles set forth in the African
Charter.117 The African Commission ultimately recommended that Zambia
allow the individuals in question to return to Zambia.118 If the African
Charter is revised to remove the claw-back clauses, there would be no need
for the African Union to continually remind states that the claw-back clauses
should not restrict the human rights guaranteed by the African Charter.
Moreover, institutionalists posit that human rights violations occur when a
human rights regime is weak and is unable to provide unambiguous norms
and rules for its member states to follow.119 The African Union must revise
the African Charter to remove the claw-back clauses in order to eliminate
ambiguity regarding the utilization of the claw-back clauses.
A number of African states have incorporated similar claw-back clauses
into their respective constitutions. For example, Equatorial Guinea’s
constitution provides that individuals have the right to freedom of expression
and freedom of association; however, such rights are subject to legislative
provisions establishing conditions under which those rights may be
exercised.120 President Mbasogo’s restrictions on freedom of expression and
freedom of assembly in Equatorial Guinea have been well documented.121
The African Union cannot with a “straight face,” condemn countries such as
Equatorial Guinea, for abusing the claw-back clauses contained in their
respective constitutions, when the founding document that establishes and
guarantees human rights in Africa—the African Charter—contains expansive
claw-back provisions. Therefore, as the organization that is responsible for
protecting human rights in Africa, the African Union should revise the
African Charter to remove the claw-back clauses in order to send a strong
message to countries such as Equatorial Guinea, that violations of human
rights through the use of claw-back clauses will not be tolerated.
It should be noted that while claw-back clauses are contained in a number
of international instruments, the claw-back clauses set forth in other
AFRICAN UNION 12 (Feb. 2011) (citing Amnesty Int’l v. Zambia, African Comm’n on Human &
Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 212/98, 125h ACHPR AAR Annex V (1998–1999), available at http://
www.lrwc.org/ws/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/ProtectiveMeasuresintheAfricanUnionNovembe
r-23.pdf).
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Cardenas, supra note 8.
120
CONSTITUTION OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA 1991, art. 13, available at http://www.constitutionn
et.org/files/Equatorial%20Guinea%20Constitution.pdf (providing an unofficial consolidated
version as amended on January 17, 1995).
121
Equatorial Guinea: Unesco-Obiang Nguema Mbasogo International Prize for Research in
the Life Sciences, ALLAFRICA.COM, Feb. 29, 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201203091099.
html.
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instruments are not as sweeping as some of the claw-back clauses contained
in the African Charter. For example, Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that the right to freedom of
expression is subject to restrictions “[f]or the respect of the rights or
reputations of others [and] [f]or the protection of national
security[,] . . . public order . . . , or of public health or morals.”122 In contrast,
Article 9 of the African Charter grants every individual the right to express
and disseminate opinions, provided that such opinions are “within the
law.”123 Under the African Charter, African leaders may simply enact a law
to prevent freedom of expression and arguably still be in compliance with the
terms of the African Charter. In contrast, under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, a state may only enact laws that limit the right
to freedom of expression if those laws are narrowly tailored to address the
rights of others, national security, public order, or public health. As such, at
a minimum the broad claw-back clauses contained in the African Charter
should be more narrowly tailored.
Another solution that may aid the African Union in ensuring member
state compliance with democratic principles is to revise Article 13 of the
African Charter. Currently, Article 13 of the African Charter provides that
“[e]very citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the Government
of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in
accordance with the provisions of the law.”124 While Article 13 arguably
provides support for the democratic process in member states, it does not
specifically provide that each individual in each member state has the right to
vote and cast a ballot to elect the leaders of his or her country. The “one
person, one vote” concept is integral to the democratic process and the
proper functioning of a truly democratic country. Sham elections where the
“one person, one vote” concept has been ignored have led to the repeated
election of President Mugabe and President Mbasogo. To better promote
democracy in African states, the African Charter should ensure that every
African citizen has the right to vote and not just the right to participate in the
political process according to the law of the individual member state.125
122
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA res. 2200A (XXI), art. 19, 21
UN GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
123
African Charter, supra note 86, art. 9.
124
Id. art. 13.
125
Article 4, Section 2 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
provides that member states must “recognize popular participation through universal suffrage as
the inalienable right of the people.” Democratic Charter, supra note 100, art. 4(2). Arguably,
the use of the term “universal suffrage” may be deemed to include the principle of “one person
one vote”; however, to date, this charter has only been ratified by fifteen member states. African
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Additionally, Article 62 of the African Charter requires member states to
submit biennial reports “on the legislative or other measures taken with a
view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recogni[z]ed and guaranteed
by the present [African] Charter.”126 As of 2007, eighteen member states
have yet to submit biennial reports to the African Union.127 As of May 2010,
Madagascar, Kenya, and Guinea-Conakry have each submitted only one state
report since ratification of the African Charter.128 Similarly, Zimbabwe and
Libya have only submitted three reports to the African Union.129 Moreover,
Equatorial Guinea, the country of the former chairman of the African Union,
has never submitted a state report.130 Institutionalists posit that a human
rights regime can encourage member state compliance with its norms and
rules by increasing the amount of available information to ensure effective
monitoring and early warning of noncompliance.131 If member states
complied with the state reporting requirements, the African Union would be
better able to gauge state compliance with the human rights and democratic
principles contained in the African Charter and Constitutive Act. From a
realist perspective, member states should be motivated to make reporting a
priority by the implementation of sanctions or other penalties for failure to
submit timely and high quality reports. The lenient approach currently taken
by the African Commission communicates to member states that the
submission of timely and accurate reports is not important. Therefore, it is
not surprising that many member states do not place a high priority on their
state reporting obligations. The African Commission should review all
reports and provide member states recommendations, as well as sanction
states for their failure to timely comply with the reporting requirements of
Article 62 of the African Charter. Moreover, Article 62 of the African
Charter should be revised to specifically provide that the African Union will
automatically issue economic and political sanctions against member states
that fail to adequately comply with the state reporting procedures in a timely
manner.
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Status of Democratic Charter].
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African Charter, supra note 86, art. 62. See generally Takele Soboka Bulto, Beyond the
Promises: Resuscitating the State Reporting Procedure Under the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights, 12 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57 (2006) (discussing in detail the state
reporting procedures).
127
STEINER, ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 101, at 1069.
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Status on Submission of State Initial/Periodic Reports to the African Commission, AFR.
COMMISSION HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS., http://old.achpr.org/english/_info/statereport_considered
_en.html (last updated May 2010).
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Id.
130
Id.
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Powell, supra note 5, at 426–27.
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While African states should be lauded for adopting the African Charter,
which recognizes the fundamental human rights of both individuals and
groups, recognizing the existence of such rights is only the first step in
assessing the effectiveness of a regional human rights system. An effective
human rights regime not only recognizes fundamental human rights but also
protects them by holding recalcitrant member states accountable for
violations.132
IV. AU RESPONSE IN MADAGASCAR AND GUINEA-CONAKRY
The following section provides an overview of, and analyzes the African
Union’s response to, the political crisis in Madagascar from both
institutionalist and realist perspectives on state compliance with international
law.
A. Madagascar
On March 17, 2009, the president of Madagascar, Marc Ravalomanana,
was forced to turn over power of the country to the military, and over 135
people were injured or killed in riots.133 It is clear that the killing of these
civilians was in violation of Article 4 of the African Charter, which provides
that “[e]very human being [is] entitled to respect for his life and the integrity
of his person.”134 The dispute between Ravalomanana and Andry Rajoelina
arose after Rajoelina was elected in 2007 as the mayor of Antananarivo, the
capital of Madagascar.135 Ravalomanana unilaterally shut down Rajoelina’s
television station, VIVA, after Rajoelina broadcast an interview with former
132
While this Article focuses on the Constitutive Act and the African Charter, member
states have adopted a number of other human rights instruments that are part of the larger
African human rights regime. See, e.g., Democratic Charter, supra note 100; Protocol to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa,
CAB/LEG/66.6 (Sept. 13, 2000), entered into force Nov. 25, 2005; African Union Convention
on Preventing and Combating Corruption, concluded July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5; OAU
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, entered into force Dec. 6, 2002,
available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/OAU-english.pdf (stating the conviction
that terrorism is a serious breach of human rights); African Charter on the Rights and Welfare
of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force Nov. 29, 1999. These
other instruments have been adopted by the African Union to address specific issues such as
democracy, women’s rights and children’s rights. This Article does not seek to determine the
efficacy of the African Union in obtaining member state compliance with these other
instruments.
133
LAUREN PLOCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40448, MADAGASCAR’S POLITICAL CRISIS 1
(2010), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/19818.pdf.
134
African Charter, supra note 86, art. 4.
135
OTTILIA MAUNGANIDZE, INST. FOR SEC. STUDIES, MADAGASCAR: ANATOMY OF A
RECURRENT CRISIS 2 (2009).
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President Didier Ratsiraka that was extremely critical of Ravalomanana.136
This action was clearly in violation of Article 9 of the African Charter, which
provides that “[e]very individual shall have the right to express and
disseminate his opinions within the law.”137 On March 17, 2009, one of the
presidential palaces was stormed and taken over by the Malagasy army.138
The military then appointed Rajoelina, Ravalomanana’s political rival, as the
leader of the government. Madagascar’s constitutional court deemed the
transfer of power valid.139 This judgment was in stark violation of Article 26
of the African Charter, which requires each member state to guarantee the
independence of its national courts and refrain from restricting the
establishment of national institutions that promote and protect the human
rights guaranteed by the African Charter.140
The African Union immediately responded to the political crisis in
Madagascar by issuing a statement deploring the loss of life caused by the
political uprising and holding talks with the relevant members of
Madagascar’s government.141 Further, the African Union responded by
invoking Article 30 of the Constitutive Act, which provides that
“[g]overnments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means
shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union.”142 In
accordance with Article 30 of the Constitutive Act, the Peace and Security
Council of African Union suspended Madagascar from the African Union
and directed Rajoelina’s administration to take concrete steps towards
returning the country to constitutional order.143 Chairperson Jean Ping then
136

Id.
African Charter, supra note 86, art. 9. The African Commission has found that “[t]he
intimidation and arrest or detention of journalists for articles published and questions asked
deprives not only the journalists of their rights to freely express and disseminate their
opinions, but also the public, of the right to information” and violates Article 9 of the African
Charter. Jawara v. Gam., African Comm’n on Human & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 147/95,
149/96, ¶ 65, 13th ACHPR AAR Annex V (1999–2000), available at http://www.worldcourts.
com/achpr/eng/decisions/2000.05.11_jawara_v_Gambia.htm.
138
MAUNGANIDZE, supra note 135, at 1.
139
Id.
140
African Charter, supra note 86, art. 26.
141
Press Release, African Union, Chairperson Ping Presents the African Union Position on the
Sudan / Chad Relationship and the Situation in Madagascar, AU Press Release 38/2009 (Jan. 30,
2009), available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/conferences/2009/January/summit/Press
_Releases.html; see also Communiqué, Statement of Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African
Union Comm’n (Feb. 3, 2009) (noting stated willingness of the conflicting parties to dialogue),
available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/conferences/2009/January/summit/Press_Relea
ses.html.
142
MAUNGANIDZE, supra note 135, at 4 (citing AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 30).
143
Id.; see also African Union, Communiqué of the 181st Meeting of the Peace and Security
Council, ¶ 4, Doc. PSC/PR/COMM.(CLXXXI) (Mar. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Communiqué
181st Meeting] (issuing suspension until restoration of constitutional order).
137
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lobbied for the establishment of an international contact group to ensure that
the international community established a common position on returning
constitutional order to Madagascar.144
The institutionalist theory provides that membership in an institution such
as a regional human rights system facilitates cooperation by encouraging
states to adhere to the norms and principles of the institution.145 The African
Union appears to have employed an effective institutionalist approach when
the organization supported the creation of the International Contact Group on
Madagascar (ICGM)146 in order to resolve the crisis and obtain Madagascar’s
adherence to the rights guaranteed by the African Charter and the democratic
principles recognized in the Constitutive Act. Additionally, from an
institutionalist perspective, the African Union appears to have appealed to
the merits of belonging to a human rights institution to force behavioral
change in Madagascar.147 With the aid of the ICGM, members of the rival
Malagasy political camps met in Maputo on August 8th and 9th, 2009 and
adopted the Charter of the Transition, the Maputo Political Agreement and
the Charter of Values Agreement, known collectively as the “Maputo
Agreements.”148 The Maputo Agreements provided for a peaceful transition
to democracy that would occur over a fifteen month period and further called
for the establishment of a “Government of National Unity,” a body to be
comprised of twenty-eight ministers, a prime minister, and three deputy
prime ministers.149
Through utilization of the ICGM, and as a result of the Maputo
Agreements and a subsequent meeting held in Addis Ababa, the Peace and
Security Council established a monitoring mechanism and an assessment
mission which collaborated with other international actors, such as the UN,
to evaluate Madagascar’s electoral needs.150 As previously noted in Part II.A
144
See Press Release, Statement by Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African Union
Commission (Apr. 7, 2009) (denoting that the African Union “initiated consultations for the
early formation of an International Contact Group” to restore constitutional order in
Madagascar).
145
Powell, supra note 5, at 426–27.
146
African Union, Press Statement of the 211th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council,
Doc. PSC/PR/BR(CCXI) (Dec. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Press Statement of PSC 211].
147
See id. (imploring states to demonstrate the political will necessary to comply with
various remedial international documents); PLOCH, supra note 133, at 4 (noting the ICGM’s
use to apply international pressure on the opposing sides).
148
See African Union, Communiqué of the 216th Meeting of the Peace and Security
Council, ¶ 2, Doc. PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCXVI) (Feb. 19, 2010) (identifying the dates of
signing and using the collective term “Maputo Agreements”); Agreement on Madagascar
Crisis Reached in Maputo, ALLAFRICA.COM (Aug. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Agreement in
Maputo] (identifying the three treaties signed at Maputo).
149
Agreement in Maputo, supra note 148.
150
Press Statement of PSC 211, supra note 146.
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of this Article, institutionalists posit that state compliance with the norms
established by a human rights regime can occur through the establishment of
effective systems for monitoring a country’s adherence to the norms of the
human rights regime and providing early warning of cheating and
noncompliance with these norms. Arguably, implementation of the ICGM
expedited resolution of the crisis because the contact group and the Peace
and Security Council has monitored the transition process and has demanded
that democratic elections occur with transparency and credibility, consistent
with the Maputo Agreements.151 To some extent, the ICGM, a monitoring
mechanism encouraged by institutionalists, compelled Rajoelina to take steps
to return Madagascar to constitutional order,152 thereby, encouraging state
compliance with the democratic norms and principles contained in the
African Charter and Constitutive Act. Moreover, this monitoring mechanism
stabilized the political crisis between Ravalomanana’s supporters and
Rajoelina’s supporters.153 Additionally, the ICGM encouraged the rivaling
parties to comply with the provisions of the Maputo Agreements, and it
continues to attempt to resolve ongoing disputes between the parties through
the contact group’s systematic and orderly dispute resolution process.154
As noted in Part II.B of this Article, from the realist perspective, states are
more inclined to cooperate when it serves their self-interest to comply. Thus,
a state is more likely to adhere to international law when the costs of
cheating (i.e., noncompliance with international obligations), are higher than
the benefits the state would reap from noncompliance. In response to
Rajoelina’s refusal to adhere to the Maputo Agreements, the African Union
imposed a number of sanctions against Raejolina including freezing his
assets and issuing travel bans against him and approximately 108 of his
supporters.155
The African Union also suspended Madagascar from
151
See LAUREN PLOCH & NICOLAS COOK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40448, MADAGASCAR’S
POLITICAL CRISIS 12–13 (2012) (describing the role of international pressure in negotiating
resolution to the political crisis).
152
African Union, Press Statement of the 202nd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council,
2, Doc. PSC/PR/BR(CCII) (Sept. 10, 2009) (expressing gratitude to the ICGM for monitoring
the Madagascar crisis).
153
PLOCH & COOK, supra note 151. Some sources indicate that the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) was the stabilizing force in the Madagascar crisis. Id. at 1.
But it is important to recall that, in its efforts to monitor the situation, ICGM was composed of
many different organizations including SADC, id. at 12, and often facilitated meetings
between SADC and other international institutions. 5th Meeting of the International Contact
Group on Madagascar, ALLAFRICA.COM (Feb. 19, 2010).
154
Press Release, Council of the European Union, 13th Africa–EU Ministerial Troika
Meeting, at 10, E.U. Press Release 14504/09 (Oct. 14, 2009); see also Madagascar: Fifth
Meeting of the International Contract Group, ALLAFRICA.COM (Feb. 10, 2010), http://allafri
ca.com/stories/201002190618.html?page=2.
155
African Union, Communiqué of the 216th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council,
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participation in the African Union.156 These targeted sanctions remain a
classic tool endorsed by realists and serve to punish cheaters in hopes of
deterring future misconduct.157 In theory, issuance of sanctions such as
freezing assets and travel bans will discourage states from cheating and
noncompliance because the costs and consequences of such sanctions are far
more detrimental than any benefits gained through noncompliance. This
realist instrument may have been successful in contributing to resolution of
the unrest in Madagascar because shortly after the African Union imposed
sanctions against Rajoelina and his supporters, the Madagascar leader chose
to cooperate with the international community.158
Article 13 of the African Charter provides that “[e]very citizen shall have
the right to participate freely in the Government of his country, either
directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the
provisions of the law.”159 Article 4(m) of the Constitutive Act provides that
the African Union must ensure member state “respect for democratic
principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance.”160 By
establishing the ICGM and levying sanctions when faced with
noncompliance by Madagascar’s rival political camps, the African Union
took one step closer toward ensuring Madagascar’s compliance with the
principles of democracy and respect for human life set forth in Article 13 of
the African Charter and Articles 4(m) and 4(o) of the Constitutive Act.
Parliamentary and presidential elections in accordance with the Maputo
Agreements were scheduled for April 13, 2011 and July 1, 2011; however,
the elections have been postponed numerous times.161 Nevertheless, on
December 8, 2011, the Peace and Security Council expressed its intention to
remove the sanctions placed on Madagascar upon submission by the
¶¶ 4, 8, Doc. PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCXVI) (Feb. 19, 2010); see also Raejolina Negotiates on
Army Demands, ALLAFRICA.COM (May 4, 2010) (identifying the specific number of Raejolina
supporters affected).
156
Communiqué 181st Meeting, supra note 143.
157
See Yang, supra note 25, at 1136–39.
158
PLOCH & COOK, supra note 151, at Summary. But see Keri Leicher, Not Out of the Woods:
Madagascar’s Troubled Road to Democracy, CONSULTANCY AFR. INTELLIGENCE (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=936:not-o
ut-of-the-woods-madagascars-troubled-road-to-democracy-&catid=57:Africa-watch-discussionpapers&Itemid-263 (summarizing the progress to the 2011 roadmap and Raejolina’s continuing
recourse to improper unilateral action contrary to the roadmap).
159
African Charter, supra note 86, art. 13.
160
AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 4(m).
161
Game Diebeela, Pre-Election Reflection: Madagascar’s (Postponed) 2011 Parliamentary
and Presidential Elections, CONSULTANCY AFR. INTELLIGENCE (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.con
sultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=689:pre-election-reflectio
n-madagascars-postponed-2011-parliamentary-and-presidential-elections-&catid=42:election=re
flection&Itemid=270.
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Southern African Development Community (SADC) of a report confirming
satisfactory progress in the implementation of the Maputo Agreements.162
The situation in Madagascar is ongoing, and the African Union must
continue its efforts to effectively resolve the crisis and return Madagascar to
constitutional order in accordance with the African Charter and Constitutive
Act. Currently, presidential elections in Madagascar are scheduled for May
8, 2013, and parliamentary elections are scheduled for July 3, 2013.163 Only
time will tell whether these elections will occur.
The following section discusses the political unrest that has unfolded in
Guinea-Conakry and analyzes the African Union’s response to the turmoil
from the institutionalist and realist perspectives of state compliance with
international law.
B. Guinea-Conakry
On December 23, 2008, the National Council for Democracy and
Development (CNDD) seized power in Guinea-Conakry (Guinea) via
military coup, named military captain Moussa Dadis Camara acting
president, and promised to hold democratic presidential and legislative
elections.164 However, CNDD soon dissolved the government and suspended
the constitution in violation of Article 4(p) of the Constitutive Act165 and
Articles 11 and 13 of the African Charter.166 Camara seemed intent to run for
president in the future scheduled elections, sparking thousands of Camara
oppositionists to peacefully demonstrate.167 On September 28, 2009, police
and militia forces released tear gas and fired at civilian demonstrators, killing
approximately 150 people and injuring many more.168 Such actions were in
clear violation of the respect for life, freedom of expression, and freedom of

162

African Union, Communiqué of the 303rd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council,
¶ 7, Doc. PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCCIII) (Dec. 8, 2011).
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Alain Iloniaina, Madagascar to Hold Presidential Election Next May, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 1,
2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-08-01/news/sns-rt-us-madagascar-electionbre870
1ny-20120801_1_president-marc-ravalomanana-andry-rajoelina-madagascar.
164
ALEXIS ARIEFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41200, GUINEA’S NEW TRANSITIONAL
GOVERNMENT: EMERGING ISSUES FOR U.S. POLICY 1 (2010).
165
The AU Constitutive Act requires member states to reject unconstitutional changes of
governments. AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 4(p).
166
ARIEFF, supra note 164. Articles 11 and 13 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights provide that every African citizen has the right to freedom of assembly and the right to
participate in his or her government. African Charter, supra note 86, arts. 11, 13.
167
ALEX ARIEFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40703, GUINEA: BACKGROUND AND RELATIONS
WITH THE UNITED STATES 6 (2011).
168
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BLOODY MONDAY: THE SEPTEMBER 28 MASSACRE AND RAPES BY
SECURITY FORCES IN GUINEA 4, 7 (2009).

2012]

THEORIES OF STATE COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 105

association principles set forth in Articles 4, 9, and 10 of the African Charter,
respectively.169
In response to Guinea’s violations of the democratic and human rights
principles set forth in the African Charter and the Constitutive Act, the
African Union condemned the unconstitutional change of government and, in
conjunction with ECOWAS and the UN Security Council, formed the
International Contact Group on Guinea (ICG-G), to provide an efficient
resolution of the crisis.170 The ICG-G, with the support of the Peace and
Security Council, pledged to resolve the political crisis in Guinea and held
discussions led by Blaise Compaoré, the President of Burkina Faso, to begin
a dispute resolution plan for Guinea.171 The ICG-G’s main objective was to
establish free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections in Guinea.172
As previously noted in Part II.A of this Article, institutionalists argue that a
human rights regime can obtain state compliance with the norms and rules it
creates by establishing effective monitoring systems to prevent the political
crises that may lead to a state’s noncompliance with human rights norms.
Arguably, institutionalists would encourage the establishment of councils,
such as the ICG-G, that serve as monitoring mechanisms to evaluate and
resolve political crises and to ensure state compliance with norms.
Therefore, the measures taken by the African Union are consistent with the

169

African Charter, supra note 86, at 4, 9–10. The African Commission has found that
shootings by police officers violate the right-for-life principle contained in Article 4 of the
African Charter. Achutan v. Malawi, African Comm’n on Human & Peoples’ Rights, Comm.
64/92, 68/92, 78/92, ¶ 6, 7th ACHPR AAR Annex VI (1994–1995), available at http://www.
worldcourts.com/achpr/eng/decisions/Undated_Achutan_v_Malawi_AR08.htm. Additionally,
with respect to Article 10 of the African Charter, the African Commission has found that
member states have a duty to abstain from interfering with the free formation of associations,
and that there “must . . . be a general capacity for citizens to join, without member state
interference, in associations in order to attain various ends.” Civil Liberties Org. v. Nigeria,
African Comm’n on Human & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 101/93, ¶ 14, 8th ACHPR AAR
Annex VI (1994–1995), available at http://www.worldcourts.com/achpr/eng/decisionns/199
5.03_Civil_Liberties_Organisation_v_Nigeria_AR08.htm.
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ARIEFF, supra note 164, at 4; see also Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the
Resurgence of the Scourge of Coups D’etat in Africa, ¶ 2 Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.220(XII)
(Feb. 2009) (condemning the change of government); Assembly of the African Union,
Decision on the Report of the Peace and Security Council on its Activities and the State of the
Peace and Security in Africa, ¶ 10, Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.252(XIII) (July 2009) (expressing
satisfaction with the International Contact Group on Guinea and those who formed it).
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African Union, Press Statement of the 206th Meeting of the Peace and Security, Doc.
PSC/PR/BR.1(CCVI) (Oct. 15, 2009).
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See International Contact Group on Guinea, NORWAY.ORG, http://www.norway.org.et/ne
ws_and_events/au/icgg/ (last updated Sept. 2, 2009) (cataloging information primarily related
to ICG-G monitoring of progress toward elections in Guinea and stressing the need to have
elections).
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institutionalist approach, where several states and institutions combine their
resources to guide states toward adherence to all applicable norms and rules.
In accordance with Article 30 of the Constitutive Act,173 on December 29,
2008, the African Union suspended Guinea and threatened further sanctions
unless the soldiers who seized power restored constitutional order.174 The
Peace and Security Council, in conjunction with ICG-G, informed Camara
that his government would face sanctions if he failed to provide by October
17, 2009, assurances that neither he nor his associates in CNDD would
participate in future presidential elections.175 When Camara refused to
comply with the African Union’s request, the Peace and Security Council
released a statement on October 29, 2009, indicating that it would “take all
the necessary measures towards the implementation of targeted sanctions,
including denial of visas, travel restrictions and freezing of assets.”176 The
realist theory posits that states are more inclined to adhere to international
law when compliance furthers their self-interests.177 As previously discussed
in Part II.B of this Article, realists frequently endorse the imposition of
targeted sanctions because realists argue that a state is more likely to comply
with international law when the calculation of compliance is economically
beneficial. Thus, if the costs of compliance with international law are lower
than the significant sanctions and high financial costs a state would incur
from failure to comply with international law, realists argue that a rational
state will choose cooperation and compliance in order to avoid the economic
loss.178 In the Guinean crisis, the African Union threatened to impose
sanctions against Camara if he failed to provide assurances that he would not
participate in upcoming presidential elections. When Camara refused to
comply with the African Union’s request, the Peace and Security Council
implemented sanctions including denial of visas, travel restrictions and
freezing of assets. Following the imposition of such sanctions, Camara
173

AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 30.
African Union, Communiqué of the 165th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council,
¶ 3, Doc. PSC/PR/Comm(CLXV) (Dec. 29, 2008).
175
Press Release, ECOWAS, 8th Session of the Int’l Contact Grop. On Guinea (ICG-G), ¶ 8,
Press Release 107/2009 (Oct. 13, 2009), available at http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb
=107&lang=en&annee=2009; African Union, Communiqué of the 204th Meeting of the Peace
and Security Council, ¶¶ 6–7, Doc. PSC/PR/Comm(CCIV) (Sept. 17, 2009), available at http://
www.africa-union.org/root/AU/organs/204%20Communique%20Rep%20%20Guinea%20204t
h%20%20%20EN%20Final.pdf. Hereinafter the above sources will collectively be referred to as
the “Camara Requirements.”
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African Union, Communique of the 207th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, ¶ 4,
Doc. PSC/AHG/COMM.2(CCVII) (Oct. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Communiqué 207th Meeting].
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BURGSTALLER, supra note 17, at 96.
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See id. at 104–05 (discussing Hanspeter Neuhold’s neorealist view that states use a costbenefit analysis in determining whether to comply with international law).
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ultimately complied with the African Union and other international actors, in
large part because he could not practically remain in power without these
sanctions being lifted.179 Additionally, after a failed assassination attempt on
Camara, on December 3, 2009, Camara quickly resigned to recover in
Burkina Faso.180
In response to Camara’s resignation, General Sekouba Konaté was
appointed interim president of the National Transition Council, the acting
interim power in Guinea.181 On January 15, 2010, with the help of the ICGG, Guinea’s leaders signed a joint declaration agreement in Ouagadougou,
Burkina Faso (Ouagadougou Agreement), which established a 155-member
transitional government led by Prime Minister Jean-Marie Doré.182 Further,
the Ouagadougou Agreement stipulated that presidential and parliamentary
elections would occur within six months of the signed agreement and
reiterated that Camara, Konaté, and other CNDD members could not
participate in the elections.183 After the transitional government took power,
it continued to comply with the requests and regulations of the African
Union. From a realist perspective, the transitional government’s continued
compliance with the requests and regulations of the African Union are
explained by the presence of consequences, such as isolation from the
African Union and the International community coupled with other
sanctions, that would have been contrary to the state’s self-interest and
detrimental to the overall power and economy of Guinea.
With the support of the international community and the ICG-G,
presidential elections occurred on June 27, 2010, in the first open election in
Guinea’s history.184 Despite a few isolated reports of violence during
campaigning, the citizens of Guinea finally enjoyed an overall peaceful
election devoid of harassment or severe injury.185 Consistent with the
institutionalist perspective’s support of monitoring mechanisms that observe
and audit state compliance with applicable norms, rules, and agreements, the
ICG-G, for a time, continued to monitor the political crisis in Guinea to
ensure compliance with the provisions of the Ouagadougou Agreement.186
Pursuant to the previously signed Ouagadougou Agreement, neither Camara
179

See ARIEFF, supra note 164, at 1–2 (describing Camara’s acquiescence to the interim
government despite strong CNDD support).
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Id. at 1.
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Id. at 1–2.
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Id. at 2.
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ARIEFF, supra note 167, at 8.
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Id.
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See id. at 8, 16 (noting praise by international and domestic monitoring groups for the
2010 elections and that ICG-G continued to operate until February 2011).
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nor his associates participated in the presidential elections, and on November
15, 2010, the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI)
announced Alpha Condé as the new president of Guinea.187 As an additional
sign of progress, in February 2012 a Guinean court filed charges against
Camara for the mass rapes and killings of civilians that occurred in 2009.188
These charges provide evidence that Guinea’s courts are becoming more
independent and more willing to hold human rights violators such as Camara
accountable as required by Article 26 of the African Charter, which requires
“the independence of the courts” of each member state and “the promotion
and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the [African]
Charter.”189 The African Union’s persistent and attentive response to the
political turmoil in Guinea serves as evidence that the organization may be
overcoming some of the problems of its predecessor, the OAU. Further, the
resolution of the crisis in Guinea indicates that the African Union has the
ability to ensure state compliance with the democratic and human rights
principles set forth in the African Charter and Constitutive Act.
The African Union’s response to the political and humanitarian turmoil in
Madagascar and Guinea suggests that the African Union is successfully
attempting to play a vital role in the resolution of the political disputes that
oftentimes lead to human rights violations in Africa. However, perhaps the
African Union’s relative success in Madagascar and Guinea190 is due in part
to a pressing need to address potential human rights violations as well as
unconstitutional changes of government that come about due to coup d’états.
In attempting to resolve such crises, the African Union is not only concerned
with state compliance with the Constitutive Act and the African Charter, but
also with state compliance with other relevant instruments that address
unconstitutional changes of government. For example, both the Charter
Protocol and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
address the African Union’s role in resolving unconstitutional changes in
governments.191
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Sarah Jones, Guinean Military Official Charged in 2009 Killings, Rapes of Protestors,
CNN (Feb. 11, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/11/world/africa/guinea-mass-rape/index.
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African Charter, supra note 86, art. 26.
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attempts to garner an election).
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Democratic Charter, supra note 100, art. 3; Charter Protocol, supra note 65, art. 7.
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V. AU RESPONSE IN ZIMBABWE, LIBYA, AND KENYA
Despite its relative achievements in countries such as Guinea, the African
Union nonetheless is unable to consistently obtain member state compliance
with the African Charter and Constitutive Act, as evidenced by the African
Union’s handling of the crisis in Zimbabwe and its feeble response to the
political crises in Libya and Kenya. This section first explores the African
Union’s response to the 2008 political crisis in Zimbabwe, followed by an
evaluation of the African Union’s paltry reaction to the violent uprisings in
Libya and the 2007 political crisis in Kenya.
A. Zimbabwe
The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), led
by Robert Mugabe, has been the major power in Zimbabwe since 1980.192
The opposition group Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was formed
during a period of economic decline in the 1990s and was lead by Morgan
Tsvangirai.193 In March 2007, police assaulted opposition members in
Zimbabwe in violation of the freedom of association and freedom of
assembly principles set forth in Articles 10 and 11, respectively,194 of the
African Charter, prompting South African President Thabo Mbeki to mediate
talks between the Government of Zimbabwe and the MDC in order to
establish a framework for democratic elections.195
In the months leading up to the elections, reports revealed that 1,775
incidents of political violence occurred196 in violation of the respect-for-life
and security-of-a-person principles set forth in Articles 4 and 6 of the
African Charter, respectively, and Article 4(o) of the Constitutive Act.197
The results of the election, which were not announced until five weeks later,
indicated that opposition leader Tsvangirai had received more votes than
incumbent President Mugabe; however, Tsvangirai had still failed to attain
the requisite 50% to secure the presidency.198 Overall, President Mugabe’s
first attempt at holding a democratic election was highly scrutinized for its
numerous inconsistencies and was generally characterized as failing to
constitute a true “free and fair” election in violation of the democratic
192

LAUREN PLOCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34509, ZIMBABWE: 2008 ELECTIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 1 (2008).
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Id. at 1, 5.
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African Charter, supra note 86, arts. 10–11.
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Id. at 1.
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Id. at 3.
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AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 4(o); African Charter, supra note 86, arts. 4, 6.
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PLOCH, supra note 192, at 6.

110

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 41:75

principles set forth in Article 13 of the African Charter and Article 4(m) of
the Constitutive Act.199
Following the election results, violent political unrest increased
exponentially. One report from the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for
Human Rights indicated that the violence at the time “[was] on such a scale
that it [was] impossible to properly document all cases.”200 Additionally,
many reports suspected a trend of violence and torture predominantly against
supporters of the MDC opposition group.201 Such actions of violence and
torture are in clear violation of Article 5 of the African Charter, which
provides in part that “all forms of exploitation and . . . degrading punishment
and treatment shall be prohibited.”202 One specific report from Amnesty
International further indicated that medical institutions often refused to treat
the victims and militia teams attacked humanitarian groups offering
assistance to victims.203 Article 16 of the African Charter provides that
member states must ensure that their citizens receive adequate medical
attention.204 Thus, the inability of Zimbabwe’s government to ensure that
medical institutions provided adequate care to victims of the political crisis
constitutes a violation of Zimbabwe’s obligation under Article 26 of the
African Charter to promote and protect the rights guaranteed by the African
Charter.205
In response to the violence in Zimbabwe, the Assembly endorsed
President Mbeki as the facilitator of mediation efforts between the rivaling
parties and called upon the SADC to establish a monitoring mechanism
designated to ensure resolution of the political crisis.206 The African Union
199
African Charter, supra note 86, art. 13; AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 4(m); see
also PLOCH, supra note 192, at 12 (“[T]he African Union expressed concern over the delayed
[election] results, ‘which creates an atmosphere of tension that is not in the least conducive to
the consolidation of the democratic process that was felicitously launched through the
organization of the elections.’ ”).
200
PLOCH, supra note 192, at 8.
201
See, e.g., id. at 8, 10.
202
African Charter, supra note 86, at 5. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l v. Sudan, African Comm’n
on Human & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93, ¶ 54, 13th ACHPR AAR
Annex V (1999–2000), available at http://www.wouldcourts.com/achpr/eng/decisions/1999.
11_Amensty_International_v_Sudan.htm (holding that physical abuse constitutes a violation
of the principles contained in Article 5).
203
PLOCH, supra note 192, at 10.
204
African Charter, supra note 86, at 16. The African Commission has found that the
enjoyment of the human right to health is “crucial to the realization of fundamental human
rights and freedoms[ ] [and] [t]his right includes the right to obtain access to health care
facilities.” See, e.g., Purohit v. The Gambia, African Comm’n on Human & People’s Rights,
Comm. 241/2001, ¶ 80, 16th ACHPR AAR Annex VII (2002–2003).
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African Charter, supra note 86, art. 26.
206
Assembly of the African Union, Resolution on Zimbabwe, Doc. Assembly/AU/Res.1
(XI) (June–July 2008).
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entrusted the SADC to lead the peacekeeping efforts but continued to
monitor the situation by retaining a position in the reference group, which
consisted of the SADC, the African Union, and the UN.207 On September 15,
2008, under the guidance of the SADC and Mbeki, the ZANU-PF and MDC
parties agreed to establish a “Government of National Unity” via the
execution of the Global Political Agreement of Zimbabwe.208 This
agreement stipulated that President Mugabe would continue as the President
of Zimbabwe and Tsvangirai would hold the Office of Prime Minister.209
Moreover, once the competing political parties had agreed to the
Government of National Unity, the Assembly and Chairman Jean Ping
encouraged the United States and the EU to remove their sanctions against
Zimbabwe in order to assist the country in rebuilding its economy.210
Consistent with the institutionalist approach, the African Union worked
together with other regional and international actors to encourage the rivaling
political parties in Zimbabwe to reach an agreement. As discussed in Part
II.A of this Article, institutionalists believe that human rights regimes can
impact the behavior of their member states by encouraging adherence to the
regime’s established norms, rules, and procedures. From an institutionalist
perspective, the African Union systematically restored order to Zimbabwe by
collaborating with other organizations including the SADC and the UN to
collectively influence Zimbabwe’s political leaders to form a Government of
National Unity. Moreover, the African Union’s collaboration with other
international actors and the appointment of President Mbeki to mediate talks,
which ultimately resulted in Zimbabwe’s cooperation with the international
community, strongly evidences the efficacy of the institutionalist theory. In
essence, the African Union was a key player in effectuating the dispute
resolution process and restoring order to Zimbabwe, while simultaneously

207
Id. (recommending that SADC establish a monitoring mechanism); see also Diplomats
Aid Mbeki with Zimbabwe, BBC (July 18, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7513060.stm
(discussing the composition of the reference group and its role in the resolution of
Zimbabwe’s political crisis).
208
Statement by His Excellency Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, the Outgoing African Union
Chairman & President of the United Republic of Tanz. at the 12th Summit of the Heads of State
& Gov’t of the African Union (Feb. 2009) [hereinafter Statement by Kikwete]; Assembly of the
African Union, Decision on Zimbabwe, ¶ 1, Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.219(XII) (Feb. 2009)
[hereinafter Decision on Zimbabwe] (identifying the September 15 agreement as the Global
Political Agreement).
209
Statement of Kikwete, supra note 208.
210
See Decision on Zimbabwe, supra note 208, ¶ 6 (noting AU general call to lift sanctions
on Zimbabwe); Zanu-PF Calls EU Sanctions Decision ‘Nonsense,’ MAIL&GUARDIAN (July
23, 2012), http://mg.co.za/article/2012-07-23-zimbabwe-zanu-pf-eu-sanctins-nonsense (noting
economic impact of U.S. and EU sanctions on Zimbabwe).
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altering the state’s behavior and enabling Zimbabwe to realize the benefits of
cooperation.
However, despite the African Union’s success, from an institutionalist
perspective, in brokering a peace deal that ended the political crisis in
Zimbabwe via the efforts of President Mbeki, it is notable that Mugabe was
allowed to remain in power. Mugabe has controlled Zimbabwe for almost
thirty-two years.211 Article 4(m) of the Constitutive Act clearly provides that
the African Union should respect democratic principles.212 By allowing
Mugabe to remain in power, the African Union is clearly failing to operate in
accordance with the terms of its founding documents. Furthermore, Mugabe
has a long track record of human rights abuses. For example, in 2006 the
African Union condemned Mugabe’s forceful eviction of citizens from their
homes in violation of the human rights principles contained in the African
Charter.213 The Assembly’s decision to support the terms of the SADC’s
Global Political Agreement of Zimbabwe,214 a power sharing agreement that
permitted Mugabe to remain in power despite his lack of respect for human
rights and democracy,215 evidences the African Union’s limited political will
and that it may be following in the footsteps of its predecessor the OAU.
From an institutionalist perspective, the African Union was successful to
the extent that, it was able to convince Mugabe and Tsvangirai to execute a
peace agreement that ended the 2008 political crisis.216 However, the African
Union did not obtain Zimbabwe’s full compliance with the democratic
principles of the African Charter and Constitutive Act because Mugabe was
allowed to remain in power in violation of these principles. Arguably,
governments of national unity may not be a real solution to the lack of
democratic governance in a particular country. In some instances, as was the
case in Zimbabwe, governments of national unity may simply lead to a
convenient co-optation of the opposition. This co-optation process may
allow leaders who are unwilling to subject themselves to the full force of
211

Robert Mugabe, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/
m/robert_mugabe/index.html (last updated Apr. 10, 2012).
212
AU Constitutive Act, supra note 2, art. 4(m).
213
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GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2006), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jan/04/zimbabwe.andrewm
eldrum. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: ZIMBABWE (2011),
available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154377.htm; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
2004 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: ZIMBABWE (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hr
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Decision on Zimbabwe, supra note 208, ¶¶ 4–5.
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See Statement by Kikwete, supra note 208 (noting the arrival at agreement to establish a
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democracy to perpetuate their power by either placating the opposition or
essentially destroying the opposition. The leaders of Zimbabwe and Kenya217
tried to placate political opponents who were cheated through sham elections
by offering a national unity government. However, in many cases the end
result is not a unity government, but a cobbling together of two groups with
different political philosophies. Thus, governments of national unity may
simply be political “marriages of convenience”218 that are used to
immediately “solve” a current crisis, but that fail to address the underlying
reasons for the crisis. As a result, the underlying problem eventually
reemerges. For example, in Zimbabwe, President Mugabe intends to run for
re-election in 2012, despite opposition from rival political camps.219
Therefore, it appears that the long-term solution is to embrace democracy in
its fullest form rather than permitting leaders like Mugabe to remain in
power under the auspices of a government of national unity.
As discussed in detail in Part II.B of this Article, realists posit that
rational state actors calculate their decisions based on maximizing two of the
most prominent state interests—power and security. It follows that state
leaders may cheat, or choose a path of noncompliance, if disregarding
international laws furthers such state interests. To deter this misconduct and
encourage compliance, realists suggest utilizing targeted sanctions, such as
travel bans and freezing assets, against states and leaders that fail to comply
with international law.220 The African Union did not impose sanctions
against Zimbabwe.221 The EU and the United States have both implemented
targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe.222 In fact, on February 15, 2012, the
217
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EU elected to maintain its sanctions against Zimbabwe despite Mugabe’s
fervent opposition to these sanctions.223 One suggestion to improve the
efficacy of the African Union as a whole, which will be discussed in further
detail in Part VI of this Article, is to encourage the African Union to timely
and uniformly impose sanctions against states who fail to comply with the
principles set forth in the African Charter and the Constitutive Act. As
demonstrated by the Zimbabwe situation, the African Union’s failure to
implement sanctions against deserving political leaders weakened the
legitimate aims of the African human rights regimes. The imposition of
sanctions by the African Union, in addition to the sanctions that were already
issued by the EU and the United States, might have provided an additional
incentive for Mugabe to relinquish power.
While it is evident that the African Union should have done much more to
effectively resolve the situation in Zimbabwe, the historical and political
situation in Zimbabwe may shed some light on the African Union’s inability
to remove Mugabe from power. The African Union was probably cognizant
of the fact that the leaders of some African countries sympathize with
Mugabe’s policy of expropriation of land from white settlers, and these
leaders may in fact have bought into Mugabe’s characterization of his
political rivals (the MDC) as lackies of Western neocolonialist powers.224
Moreover, it is well known that Mugabe was vocal in opposing apartheid in
South Africa.225 As a result, some leaders view Mugabe as a comrade in
arms in the historic fight against apartheid and colonization.226 Thus, South
Africa’s reluctance in pushing for Mugabe’s ouster, and former President
Thabo Mbeki’s apparently biased mediation in favor of Mugabe, are
223
Council Decision 2012/97/CFSP of 17 February 2012 amending Decision
2011/101/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Zimbabwe (EU), 2012 O.J. (L 47) 50.
224
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Zimbabwe Elections, NEWZIMBABWE.COM, http://www.newzimbabwe.com/PAGES/electoral4.
11160.html (last updated Nov. 12, 2009) (noting comments of sympathy for Mugabe’s stance
against “former imperialists”).
225
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probably a result of Mugabe’s historical position against apartheid. As such,
the African Union’s lack of success in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis may
be due in part to the African Union’s overreliance on President Mbeki’s role
as SADC mediator to Zimbabwe.
Similarly, from a realist perspective, Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act
authorizes the African Union to intervene in the affairs of a country in grave
circumstances such as crimes against humanity and genocide.227 Arguably
the African Union should have invoked Article 4(h) to intervene in
Zimbabwe and remove Mugabe, who has a long history of human rights
abuses, from power. However, this would have essentially amounted to
regime change in Zimbabwe, and as discussed in Part V.B of this Article,
member states of the African Union have decried regime change in other
countries, such as Libya, as attacks on Africa’s right to self-determination.
Perhaps the African Union’s inability to effectuate regime change in
Zimbabwe is due not only to a lack of political will or the historical and
political situation in Zimbabwe, but also to a lack of resources228 and
complications resulting from additional players with different political
agendas, such as the SADC.229 Furthermore, regime change may be easier
said than done, as exemplified by the problems that some powerful nations
are facing in Iraq, a country where regime change was externally imposed,230
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and in Syria, a country that may in the future be subject to externally
imposed regime change.231
B. Libya
Gaddafi led Libya’s 1969 revolution against the Libyan monarchy four
decades ago, and while Gaddafi always insisted that he maintained no formal
governmental position, his authoritarian leadership controlled the country
until his death in 2011.232 Gaddafi’s forty-year authoritarian leadership was
clearly in violation of Article 13 of the African Charter, which provides that
every individual has “the right to participate freely in the government of his
country, either directly or [indirectly] through freely chosen
representatives.”233 Additionally, Gaddafi’s long rule of Libya was also in
violation of the democratic principles contained in the Constitutive Act, more
specifically, Articles 3(g) and 4(m).234 Further, the 2009 U.S. Department of
State report on human rights in Libya labeled the country’s human rights
record as “poor,”235 and provided that the country faced “[c]ontinuing
problems includ[ing] reported disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrest and
imprisonment, lengthy pretrial and sometimes incommunicado detention,
official impunity, and poor prison conditions.”236 Despite Gaddafi’s tainted
past, the African Union nonetheless elected him to serve as chairman of the
African Union in 2009 for a one-year term.237 Gaddafi had long-standing ties
to the African Union. In fact, Gaddafi typically receives credit in full as the
driving force behind the establishment of the African Union, which
culminated in the Sirte Declaration at the fourth extraordinary session of the
231
For a discussion of the challenges associated with imposing regime change in Syria, see
generally JERRY M. SHARP & CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL33487, ARMED CONFLICT IN SYRIA: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE (2012). See also
Amos N. Guiora, Northern Africa and the Mideast: to Where?: Intervention in Libya, Yes;
Intervention in Syria, No: Deciphering the Obama Administration, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L
L. 251 (2011) (examining U.S. response to Libyan and Syrian crises in light of international
law and humanitarian intervention); Kofi Annan Resigning as U.N. Envoy to Syria,
CBSNEWS.COM (Aug. 2, 2012, 12:58 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-574853
09/kofi-annan-resigning-as-u.n-envoy-to-syria/ (noting a shrinking likelihood of finding a
diplomatic solution to the Syrian crisis).
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OAU in 1999.238
Gaddafi had also provided significant financial
contributions to the African Union since its inception in 2000.239
On February 15, 2011, pro-democracy protests marked the beginning of a
violent uprising against Gaddafi.240 Libyan security forces opened fire on
opposition activists and chaos ensued, allegedly escalating until attacks on
secure locations prompted Libyan forces to fire with heavy weaponry.241
Such confrontations between government authorities and the opposition
caused the deaths and likely severe injuries of several unarmed protestors in
violation of the right to life and liberty principles set forth in Articles 4 and 6
of the African Charter.242 Ultimately, the opposition created an Interim
Transitional National Council that sought international recognition as a
formal, organized body and alternative to the Gaddafi regime.243 In an
attempt to quell the escalating opposition, Gaddafi loyalists reportedly fired
on crowds and protestors.244 This reckless response by the Gaddafi regime
contributed to the estimated 30,000 people who were killed.245 With Libya
on the brink of civil war, regional and international actors intervened.
Deliberations among participating nations resulted in a demand for Gaddafi’s
immediate departure, yet Gaddafi refused to relinquish power.246 The
International Criminal Court later issued arrest warrants for Gaddafi, one of
his sons, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and his head of military intelligence,
Abdullah al-Senussi.247
The UN Security Council requested that Gaddafi’s government adhere to
Resolution 1973 (UN Resolution 1973), a proposition that necessitated “an
immediate cease-fire, . . . declare[d] a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace, . . . and
238
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authorize[d] member states ‘to take all necessary measures . . . to protect
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.’ ”248 While the
Assembly acknowledged the need for an immediate cease-fire in Libya as
required by UN Resolution 1973,249 the Assembly rejected foreign military
intervention and instead encouraged peaceful resolution of the Libyan
conflict.250 Arguably, there may be a causal connection between the African
Union’s lack of response and the significant monetary contributions made by
Gaddafi to the African Union each year. The sum of Libya’s annual
membership dues, along with the dues of several poorer countries paid by
Gaddafi, amounts to an estimated $40 million per year.251 Moreover, the
former Libyan leader had billions of dollars at his disposal for further
potential contributions.252 The paraphrased statement of one analyst,
Delphine Lecoutre of the French Center for African Studies at Addis Ababa
University, stated that “even leaders who find [Gaddafi]’s behavior
repugnant [still] fear his wrath if the [African Union] should anger him.”253
Thus, it appears that the African Union may have failed to support
international intervention in Libya because the organization feared Libya
would withdraw from the African Union or terminate its financial
contributions in the event that sanctions were imposed on the country.
Although the fact that Gaddafi made financial contributions to the African
Union is well-known, the extent of, and the African Union’s reliance on,
these contributions may be grossly overstated. Based on the African Union
formula for contributions of each respective country, Libya, Egypt, Algeria,
Nigeria, and South Africa each contribute 15% towards the African Union’s
annual budget.254 Therefore, it could be argued that Gaddafi held the same
amount of power over the African Union as did Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, and
South Africa. Additionally, though Gaddafi often agreed to host special
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meetings of the African Union at his expense in Libya,255 he also hosted
similar meetings for the Arab League256 and the Community of Sahelian and
Sahara States (CEN-SAD)257 without any suggestion that he was controlling
the countries of the Arab League or CEN-SAD. Furthermore, Gaddafi was
well-known for interfering in African conflicts by providing financing to
various rebels in countries such as Liberia,258 Sierra Leone,259 Chad, Niger,
Mali, and Uganda.260 Thus, many African heads of state may in fact have
had their own grievance with Gaddafi and may not have been Gaddafi’s socalled little minions, as many have argued.261
Additionally, many have argued that South Africa and the African Union
failed to support military action in Libya because Gaddafi allegedly
supported the African National Congress (ANC), thus allowing the ANC to
ultimately end apartheid in South Africa.262 However, according to former
President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, this “support” was fictitious:
[T]he incontrovertible fact is that during [apartheid], Libya did
not give the ANC even one cent, did not train even one of our
military combatants, and did not supply us with even one
bullet. This is because Gadaffi’s Libya made the determination
that the ANC was little more than an instrument of Zionist
Israel, because we had among our leaders such outstanding
255
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patriots as the late Joe Slovo. Libya came to extend assistance
to the ANC after 1990, when it realised that the ANC was a
genuine representative of the overwhelming majority of our
people.263
There is a growing concern in the African Union that Africa’s right to selfdetermination, which was acknowledged in the UN’s Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,264 is not only
being encroached upon by a lack of respect for international law but also by
powerful countries’ co-opting the UN Security Council for their own
purposes.265 African leaders such as President Mbeki view the Security
Council’s response to Libya, particularly UN Resolution 1973, as a perfect
example of this problem. UN Resolution 1973 was adopted to protect
civilians in Libya and effectuate a ceasefire.266 However, according to
President Mbeki, UN Resolution 1973 was misused by NATO members to
effectuate regime change in Libya despite the fact that the “Resolution said
nothing about ‘regime change.’ ”267 The Peace and Security Council
expressed a similar view at its 275th meeting:
[The] Council stresses the need for all countries and
organizations involved in the implementation of Security
Council resolution 1973 (2011) to act in a manner fully
consistent with international legality and the resolution’s
provisions, whose objective is solely to ensure the protection of
the civilian population. [The Peace and Security Council
urged] all involved to refrain from actions, including military
operations targeting Libyan Senior Officials and socioeconomic [sic] infrastructure, that would further compound the
situation and make it more difficult to achieve international
consensus on the best way forward.268
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Thus, although some African countries may have been unmotivated to act
by Gaddafi’s financial contributions, it appears that the African Union and
several African countries failed to support military action in Libya because
they may have viewed the Security Council and NATO’s use of UN
Resolution 1973 as an attack on African self-determination.
On February 24, 2011, the African Union finally publicly criticized the
actions of the Gaddafi regime.269 The African Union established a high-level,
ad hoc committee (Libyan Committee) comprised of the African
Commission chairperson and the presidents of Mali, Uganda, the Republic of
Congo, Mauritania, and South Africa.270 During the May 25, 2011
extraordinary session Assembly meeting, the Libyan Committee set forth
recommendations for the peaceful resolution of the Libyan crisis in an “AU
Roadmap.”271 The Assembly ultimately adopted the AU Roadmap, along
with the Libyan Committee’s purported recommendations, agreeing to
endorse the following preliminary steps:
(i) a further visit to Libya to pursue the dialogue initiated with
the parties, including [a discussion of] [the urgent] issue of the
ceasefire, for which the Ad hoc Committee intends [to table] a
detailed document;
(ii) the dispatching of a ministerial delegation to New York to
interact with the [Security Council] and its members; and
(iii) practical steps to engage specific AU bilateral partners on
the Roadmap and [the actions] to be taken by the international
community to facilitate an early resolution of [the conflict] in
Libya.272
The African Union’s establishment of the Libyan Committee stands as a
quintessential employment of the institutionalist approach in international
Communiqué 275th Meeting].
269
Libya: Africa’s Rights Body Should Act Now, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 26, 2011).
270
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union high-level ad hoc committee on Libya-Outcomes of the Meeting, NEPAD PLAN. &
COORDINATING AGENCY (May 30, 2011), http://www.nepad.org/economicandcorporategovernan
ce/knowledge/doc/2259/african-union-high-level-ad-hoc-committee-libya-ou [hereinafter Ad hoc
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relations. Together with allied international actors, the African Union’s
response team sought to pursue a dialogue with parties to the Libyan crisis,
obtain implementation of the AU Roadmap, and monitor—and ultimately
resolve—the crisis in Libya.273 A team such as this Libyan Committee
arguably constitutes a monitoring mechanism, an idea fervently encouraged
by the institutionalist perspective. As previously noted in Part II.A of this
Article, the institutionalist standpoint supports these monitoring mechanisms,
as such tactics may serve to urge compliance and cooperation, monitor
cheating, and systematically maintain order and resolution. However,
although the African Union established the Libyan Committee, the
Committee enjoyed little success once created. For example, the AU
Roadmap adopted by the Libyan Committee failed to stop the daily violent
clashes between the rebels and Gaddafi’s supporters.274
Additionally, while the Peace and Security Council welcomed Gaddafi’s
decision to initially accept the AU Roadmap,275 negotiations eventually fell
through. In fact, the peace plan that was tentatively approved by Gaddafi did
not include a provision for Gaddafi’s removal from power.276 In June of
2011, the Libyan Committee announced that it would attempt to broker
peace negotiations despite the fact that Gaddafi was not participating.277
Negotiations eventually broke down again as the Libyan rebels objected to
any plan that would permit Gaddafi to remain in power.278 The Libyan rebels
believed that members of the Libyan Committee, such as President Zuma of
South Africa, were long time allies of Gaddafi and were therefore partial to
ensuring that Gaddafi remained in power.279
Moreover, Gaddafi’s financial contributions to the African Union may
also have led the Libyan rebels to conclude that the African Union’s Libyan
273
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Committee supported Gaddafi’s retention of power. In sum, while the
institutionalist theory promotes the creation of international committees that
can serve as monitoring mechanisms to resolve crises and obtain state
compliance with norms and rules, utilization of tactics consistent with this
theory may prove to be useless if the resolution team lacks efficacy and
genuine intentions to achieve resolution. This may have been the case with
the Libyan Committee, which appears to have lacked impartiality. From an
institutionalist perspective, the African Union clearly failed to obtain
Gaddafi’s compliance with the human rights and democratic norms
contained in the African Charter and Constitutive Act. The Peace and
Security Council eventually acknowledged that the African Union mediation
efforts in Libya failed.280
On June 15, 2011, Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda, Uganda’s Permanent
Representative to the UN, delivered the African Union’s stance on NATO’s
military presence in Libya during a meeting between the UN Security
Council and the Libyan Committee.281 Dr. Rugunda acknowledged that
further dialogue and action on the part of the African Union should have
occurred much sooner given that Libya is a founding member of the African
Union.282 Dr. Rugunda described the Libyan conflict as a civil war, and he
expressed that the characterization of the violence in Libya as genocide or
imminent genocide was simply an attempt “to use it as a pretext for the
undermining of the sovereignty of States.”283 Dr. Rugunda stated that the
African Union encouraged the promotion of dialogue, the implementation of
a transitional mechanism, and an overall peaceful resolution of the conflict in
Libya.284
In sum, while Dr. Rugunda’s statement of the African Union’s position
supports effective institutionalist measures, such as monitoring mechanisms
and the collaboration of institutions to effectuate peaceful resolution, his
casual characterization of the violence in Libya as a mere civil war not
graduated to the classification of genocide unveils the blatant inadequacies of
the African Union and a potential bias in favor of Libya. In fact, Libya’s
own representative to the UN, Ibrahim Dabbashi, claimed that Gaddafi had
280
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committed genocide against the people of Libya.285 Furthermore, Gaddafi
appears to have threatened the Libyan people and the opposition with
genocide in a speech given in February of 2011.286 Additionally, Dr.
Rugunda accused the international community of an attempt to undermine
the sovereignty of states.287 This sounds strikingly similar to the statements
made by several African heads of state who sought to utilize the OAU
Charter’s noninterference clause to shield themselves from international
intervention.288 Thus, in order to rectify its inconsistencies and successfully
protect the human rights of African peoples, the African Union must respond
to grave violations of larger countries such as Libya just as tenaciously as it
has responded to violations by smaller countries such as Guinea (as
discussed in Part IV.B of this Article).
The African Union’s inability to resolve the crisis in Libya may have
been exacerbated by the roles of the Arab League and NATO, two
organizations with competing political agendas. Dr. Rugunda essentially
alleged that other countries used the Libyan crisis to perpetuate regime
change in Libya, and as a result, he claimed that the UN and NATO were not
impartial in their response to the Libyan crisis.289 On the other hand, leaders
of the member states of the Arab League have historically avoided any action
that could be perceived as supporting Western intervention in Arab countries
and have resorted to using anti-western language to “distract public attention
from other, far more serious problems [in their countries].”290 In his speech
to the UN, Dr. Rugunda condemned NATO and the international community
for “[i]gnoring the AU for three months” and instead proceeding with
reckless bombings, actions that he classified as “arrogant and provocative.”291
It may be that neither NATO nor the Arab League has taken the African
Union seriously, either in its role in resolving African crises generally or in
its suggestions for peaceful resolution of the Libyan crisis. Thus, the African
Union’s credibility and effectiveness on the international stage was called
into question and likely contributed to the African Union’s inability to
effectively resolve the Libyan crisis. For example, the Libyan rebels already

285

Colin Moynihan, Libya’s U.N. Diplomats Break with Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2011.
Gaddafi Speech Threatens to Trigger “Genocide” in Libya, GLOBALPOST (Feb. 22, 2011),
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/africa/110222/gaddafi-speech-genocide-libya.
287
Rugunda, supra note 281.
288
See supra Part III.
289
Rugunda, supra note 281.
290
Barry Rubin, The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 73, 73 (2002).
For a detailed discussion of anti-Americanism in the Arab world, see generally, Lisa Blaydes
& Drew A. Linzer, Elite Competition, Religiosity, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World,
106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 225 (2012).
291
Rugunda, supra note 281.
286

2012]

THEORIES OF STATE COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 125

believed that the African Union was biased in favor of Gaddafi,292 and
because the Security Council and NATO ignored the African Union’s
recommendations for resolution, the Libyan rebels and Gaddafi were likely
more inclined to ignore the African Union’s attempts to address the crisis.
According to realists, the extent to which a state’s behavior conforms to
international law depends on a state’s political, economic, and military
power in comparison to its surrounding states293 and human rights regime.294
Consistent with the realist approach, the African Union attempted to exert
political power over Libya by joining other international players, such as the
EU, the United States, Russia, and the Arab League, in publicly
communicating vehement opposition to the Gaddafi regime’s vicious attacks
on civilians.295 The Assembly endorsed the UN Security Council’s adoption
of Resolution 1970,296 a proposition imposing an arms embargo on Libya as
well as financial and travel sanctions on Gaddafi and certain members of his
government.297 Specifically, the United States, the EU, Japan, South Korea,
and other countries imposed additional sanctions on Gaddafi and restricted
financial transactions and arms shipments to Libya.298 The EU expanded
existing sanctions “to include a visa ban and asset freezes on [particular]
individuals.”299
In contrast, the African Union failed to impose direct financial sanctions
on Gaddafi or Libya.300 Simply put, the African Union’s response appears
feeble in comparison to the ardent efforts of other international actors. From
a realist perspective, states are more likely to comply with international law
when the costs of noncompliance outweigh the benefits of noncompliance.301
However, while the measures contained in Resolution 1970 are coherent with
the realist perspective, these measures were merely endorsed by the African
Union and were not actually initiated or implemented.302 From a realist
perspective, the African Union needs to individually impose sanctions on its
member states in order to increase the likelihood of member state compliance
292

Fadel, supra note 279.
BURGSTALLER, supra note 17, at 96.
294
See id. at 97 (noting the realist idea that pressures from the international community can
override domestic concerns and achieve uniform behavior).
295
BLANCHARD, supra note 232, at 5.
296
Decision on Resolution of Libyan Crisis, supra note 249, ¶ 7.
297
S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
298
BLANCHARD, supra note 232, at 5.
299
Id. at 16.
300
African Union Declines Action Against Libya, VOICE OF AM., http://www.voanews.com/
content/african-union-declines-action-against-libya--117095183/157547.html (last updated Feb.
17, 2011).
301
See supra Part II.B.
302
Decision on Resolution of Libyan Crisis, supra note 249.
293

126

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 41:75

with the African Charter and Constitutive Act. By inflicting targeted
financial and travel sanctions on Gaddafi and his supporters the African
Union could have alleviated the concerns of both the international
community and the Libyan rebels regarding the African Union’s alleged lack
of impartiality, which were due to the financial contributions it received from
Gaddafi. This might have led the Libyan rebels to support, rather than
oppose, the African Union’s attempts to resolve the crisis.
When the Libyan rebels eventually seized power from Gaddafi and
established the National Transitional Council (NTC), the African Union
initially refused to recognize the NTC as the legitimate government of
Libya.303 The African Union’s initial refusal to recognize the NTC may have
been due in part to Article 30 of the Constitutive Act. Article 30 suspends
governments that come to power through unconstitutional means from
participation in the African Union.304 Of course the irony here is that
Gaddafi, like many other African leaders of that era, unconstitutionally came
to power by overthrowing the Libyan royal family in 1969.305 In September
of 2011, the African Union finally recognized the NTC as the de facto
government in Libya.306 This was one month after the United States and a
number of other European countries had recognized the NTC.307 The
African Union’s failure to timely recognize the NTC is indicative of its lack
of efficacy in resolving the Libyan crisis. On January 30, 2012, the
Assembly directed the African Union Commission to take all steps necessary
to establish an AU Liaison Office in Libya to monitor the situation in
Libya.308
303
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In sum, the African Union should have timely exercised its authority to
counteract the human rights violations committed by Gaddafi. Article 4(h)
of the Constitutive Act allows the African Union to intervene in the affairs of
a member state in grave circumstances such as crimes against humanity and
genocide.309 The African Union could have utilized Article 4(h) to exert its
authority during the Libyan crisis by deploying a peacekeeping force to
Libya. Additionally, the African Union should have imposed financial and
travel sanctions on Gaddafi and other individuals in his entourage in
accordance with the Constitutive Act, which permits the African Union to
impose sanctions when a member state fails to comply with the decisions and
policies of the African Union.310 The African Union’s feeble response to the
Libyan crisis was heavily criticized by the international community. For
example, a February 25, 2011 report revealed that several civil society
organizations organized a press briefing regarding Africa’s part in the Libyan
revolts; the briefings were held in Rosebank, Johannesburg by a panel
consisting of Civicus, Amnesty International, Global Call to Action against
Poverty, and African Democracy Forum.311 Ingrid Srinath, secretary general
of Civicus, asserted that “Libya is part of the AU. . . . There’s a need to send
a message across Africa about what the AU stands for. If the AU is going to
be the last to respond, what does [that lack of response] say about [the AU’s]
legitimacy?”312 According to the report “for Noel Kututwa, who deals with
foreign policy at Amnesty International, the international community has
failed the Libyan people in their hour of greatest need. . . . he said the
African Union should start showing concrete action towards African
conflicts.”313 Moreover, Rajesh Latchman of Global Call to Action against
Poverty believes that democracy and human rights in Africa have been
threatened by the African Union’s failure to take appropriate action in
Libya.314 Unfortunately, the African Union’s performance during the Libyan
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crisis demonstrated an unwillingness to exert strong disciplinary measures
against large countries that are led by its wealthy benefactors, such as
Gaddafi. Furthermore, from a realist perspective the organization lacks the
requisite characteristics of timeliness and efficacy to minimize conflict in
such countries or obtain compliance with the African Charter or Constitutive
Act.
The following section examines the political turmoil in Kenya and the
African Union’s efforts to resolve the crisis. Similar to the organization’s
response to the human rights violations in Libya, the African Union’s actions
were feeble in comparison to the resources and attention other international
organizations committed.
C. Kenya
In the December 2007 presidential elections, polls predicted that the
Orange Democratic Movement political party would win the election and
Raila Odinga would become the next president of Kenya.315 The Electoral
Commission of Kenya eventually declared that President Kibaki had been reelected, but the election process was controversial. International and
domestic observers described the election as “rigged and deeply flawed.”316
Even the chairman of the Electoral Commission, Samuel Kivuitu, “admitted
the irregularities and claimed he was pressured into announcing the
results.”317 Such coercion violates the democratic principles contained in the
African Charter and Constitutive Act.
Brutal violence erupted in Kenya immediately after the election results
were announced. Observers described supporters of the opposition engaging
in “spontaneous demonstrations of anger” and violently attacking progovernment districts and properties.318 Such violence resulted in the deaths
of more than 1,000 individuals and the displacement of around 350,000,
including 80,000 children under the age of five319 in violation of the respect
for life and dignity principles contained in Articles 4 and 5 of the African
Charter, respectively.320 Some protestors were reported to have been “shot
and killed by police, while many others died [as a result] of mob violence.”321
315
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Accountability?, 3 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 78, 80 (2009).
316
TED DAGNE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34378, KENYA: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND THE
CHALLENGES AHEAD 8 (2011).
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Nmaju, supra note 315, at 80.
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DAGNE, supra note 316, at 10.
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African Charter, supra note 86, arts. 4–5.
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DAGNE, supra note 316, at 10.
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Other reports allege that, Kenyan security forces targeted opposition
supporters, provided assistance to pro-government gangs, and failed to
protect the civilian population322 in violation of Article 6 of the African
Charter, which provides that “[e]very individual [has] the right to liberty for
and the security of his person,” and “no one may be arbitrarily arrested or
detained.”323 The Kenyan police have been blamed for much of the brutality
that occurred during the post-election violence.324 In 2008, the Peace and
Security Council estimated that as a result of the election violence in Kenya
approximately 235,000 people were in Internationally Displaced Persons
(IDP) camps, 270,000 were believed to be outside of these camps, and
12,000 people were refugees in Uganda.325
Soon after the post-election violence erupted, the Peace and Security
Council condemned the violence in Kenya,326 and former chairperson of the
African Union, President Kufuor of Ghana, traveled to Kenya in an attempt
to resolve the conflict.327 However, President Kufuor’s attempts to initiate
peace negotiations between the rivaling political factions were not welcomed
by the Kenyan government.328 After President Kufuor’s failed attempt to
initiate negotiations between the parties, the UN became involved. On
January 22, 2008, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan traveled to
Nairobi with a mediation team to begin negotiation efforts between President
Kibaki and Odinga.329 On February 28, 2008, after a month of negotiations,
Kibaki and Odinga signed a power-sharing agreement that created the prime
minister position, to be held by Odinga, as well as a multi-party cabinet.330
Although the power-sharing agreement brought an end to the post-election
violence, some argue that the agreement was rushed and did not allow
President Kibaki and Odinga to develop a working partnership.331
Additionally, the power-sharing agreement did not address the underlying
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324
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ethnic and political tensions that ignited the violence in the first place.332
Nevertheless, Jakaya Kikwete, former Chairperson of the African Union has
maintained that the African Union “succeeded in bringing the two warring
parties to the negotiating table, efforts that culminated in the establishment of
the Government of National Unity.”333
Institutionalists posit that the rules and norms created by a human rights
regime can engender member state compliance.334 From an institutionalist
perspective the African Union failed in its attempt to ensure that Kenya
complied with the democratic and human rights principles contained in
Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the African Charter and Article 4(m) of the
Constitutive Act.335 Based on those principles, the African Union’s efforts to
end the violence and crisis in Kenya via brokering a peace deal between
President Kibaki and Odinga that would bring Kenya back into compliance
with the norms set forth in the African Charter and Constitutive Act was a
complete failure.336 It was not until Kofi Annan and the UN got involved that
a power-sharing agreement was signed.337
From an institutionalist
perspective, merely attempting to initiate negotiations was not enough to
332

See The National Accord and Reconciliation Act No. 2 (2008), KENYA GAZETTE No. 12,
available at http://www.kenyalawreports.or.ke/klr/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Bills/2008/The_Nati
onal_Accord_and_Reconciliation_Bill_2008.pdf (establishing offices, their functions, and
procedures for selection with the goal of addressing the political crisis, but failing to identify
those causes specifically or set clear standards addressing them); see also Jeremy Horowitz, CTR.
FOR THE STUDY OF CIVIL WAR, Power-Sharing in Kenya (2008), available at http://www.prio.
no/sptrans/-1593447654/Kenya%20Policy%20Breif.pdf (rationalizing the likelihood of renewed
violence, despite the agreement, because of the failure to address fundamental, polarizing
grievances). See generally Justice Mkhabela, Kenya: From Democratic and Economic Engine to
Security and Economic Crisis, AFR. EXECUTIVE 17–23 (Aug. 2011), http://www.africanexecutiv
e.com/downloads/Policy%20Brief,%20Kenya-1.pdf (discussing ethnic tensions in Kenya).
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While the African Union’s initial attempts to resolve the Kenyan crisis failed, Secretary
General Kofi Annan’s mediation effort, which eventually resolved the Kenyan crisis, was
originally configured as a joint United Nations and African Union effort. Evolution of
Mediation Efforts, supra note 325, ¶ 7; see also Press Statement of the Peace & Sec. Council
on Its 113th Meeting, PSC/PR/BR(CXIII) (Feb. 28, 2008) (discussing developments in the
mediation process). Furthermore, the African Union expressly supported Kofi Annan’s
mediation efforts and encouraged the rivaling political camps in Kenya to cooperate in the
negotiation process. Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Activities of the Peace
and Security Council of the African Union and the State of Peace and Security in Africa, ¶ 15,
Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.177(X) (Jan.–Feb., 2008).
However, the African Union
acknowledged that Kofi Annan would take over negotiations between the rivaling camps
because the African Union’s efforts to mediate the crisis failed. Kofi Anan to Head
Meditation Efforts, supra note 336. Ultimately, the power-sharing agreement was executed
due to the efforts of Kofi Annan and the United Nations not the African Union.
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ensure compliance and cooperation by the rivaling political factions in
Kenya. Additionally, despite the fact that the power-sharing agreement
immediately ended the crisis, the power-sharing agreement has only been
marginally successful at eliminating human rights violations in Kenya. For
example, in March 2009 unknown gunmen assassinated two human rights
advocates, Kamau King’ara and John Paul Oulu.338 Several of the key
reforms agreed to in the power-sharing agreement have yet to be
implemented by the Kenyan government.339 Prime Minister Odinga
acknowledged this shortcoming in June of 2008 at a meeting with members
of the Bush Administration and of Congress.340 Additionally, although the
power-sharing agreement resolved the immediate political dispute in Kenya
“it also institutionalized systemic political deadlock and set the stage for
other African experiments in power sharing, notably in Zimbabwe.”341
Today, the Kenyan government continues to struggle with promoting good
governance, and as national elections “draw near in [Kenya,] a country [that
remains] sharply divided along tribal lines, observers say lawmakers are
prioritizing political expedience at the expense of constitutional
implementation.”342 As recently as June 2012, the Kenyan parliament
attempted to pass legislation that would safeguard their incumbency during
upcoming elections.343
While the African Union did attempt to assist in the mediation efforts in
Kenya, it has not made any attempt to encourage the prosecution of those
Kenyan officials that were responsible for the post-election violence. The
African Union has actually supported Kenya’s resistance to prosecuting these
individuals. In December of 2010, the International Criminal Court (ICC)
Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo claimed that six senior Kenyan
officials were responsible for the violence that followed the 2007 election.344
Initially the Kenyan Government agreed to cooperate with the ICC.345
However, Kenya reversed its position and received support from the African
Union to defer the ICC prosecution.346 The African Union’s reluctance to
338
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support the Kenyan ICC prosecutions is indicative of the African Union’s
wider negative stance on the ICC.347 The African Union has historically been
concerned with what the African Union sees as a discriminatory double
standard in ICC prosecutions. The African Union, along with many of its
member states, believes that the ICC is quite willing to prosecute individuals
for human rights violations in Africa but fails to prosecute Westerners for
human rights abuses, such as those in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.348
The African Union’s concern regarding the ICC may be valid given the
fact that almost all of the ICC’s indictments and prosecutions have involved
African individuals and African conflicts.349 However, it is true that Africa
continues to be plagued with vast human rights abuses. As such, perhaps the
ICC’s record of prosecuting African individuals simply reflects the large
number of human rights abuses that occur in Africa. In either case, the
perception that the ICC is willing to prosecute Africans but not Westerners
must be resolved jointly by the African Union and the ICC. Despite the
African Union’s stance on the ICC, it appears that Kenya is beginning to
cooperate with the ICC to some extent. President Kibaki has recently
promised to resolve the problems born by displaced victims of the political
crisis.350 Further, on January 23, 2012, the ICC ruled that four prominent
Kenyans must stand trial for crimes against humanity committed during the
political crisis in 2007–2008.351 Kenyan judges took the time to explain the
ICC ruling at a public session.352
(Jan. 2011).
347
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Press Statement of the Peace & Sec. Council on Its 141st Meeting, PSC/PR/BR(CXLI) (July
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pursue justice are disruptive the process of attaining lasting peace in Africa).
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349
ALEXIS ARIEFF ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34665, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT CASES IN AFRICA: STATUS AND POLICY ISSUES 7–8 (2011).
350
ICC Prosecutor Hails Ruling on Kenya as Crucial Step for Country’s Future, UN NEWS
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Analyzing the African Union’s response from a realist perspective
indicates that the African Union’s response to the postelection crisis in
Kenya was enormously ineffective at eliminating the human rights violations
as well as ensuring Kenya’s compliance with the human rights and
democratic principles contained in the African Charter and Constitutive Act.
The realist perspective suggests that states will choose to abide by their
international obligations only when it is in their self-interest to do so.353
Therefore, states perform a cost-benefit analysis in determining whether to
comply with their human rights obligations, and the African Union should
effectively communicate that the costs of non-compliance outweigh the
benefits. Unfortunately, the African Union did not initiate or implement any
measures that would communicate to Kenya that the cost of noncompliance
outweighed the benefits.
The African Union did not sanction Kenya with financial penalties.354
Furthermore, the African Union’s attempt to initiate negotiations was feeble
and ineffective. The African Union’s support of the delay in the ICC
prosecutions is also inconsistent with a realist approach to international
relations. As discussed in Part II.B of this Article, realists posit that states
are more likely to comply with international law when the cost of
noncompliance outweighs the benefits of compliance. By failing to support
the ICC prosecutions, the African Union has communicated to Kenya that it
is in the country’s best interest not to comply with its obligations under
Articles 1 and 26 of the African Charter, which provide that member states
must promote, protect, and recognize the human rights and democratic
principles contained in the African Charter.355 Despite the African Union’s
failure to resolve the Kenyan crisis on its own accord, it is important to
acknowledge that the Kenyan crisis presented a unique set of circumstances
that possibly go beyond the African Union’s ability to both eliminate human
rights violations and ensure compliance with the principles contained in the
African Charter and the Constitutive Act. The Kenyan crisis involved the
creation of a post-electoral, power-sharing agreement as well as a new
constitution. As such, perhaps the ultimate solution to the Kenyan crisis had
to involve the participation of mediators and mechanisms outside of the
African Union itself (even if the African Union remained nominally part of
the process).
doc1314543.pdf.
353
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354
See generally Innocent Madawo, The African Union’s Madagascar Sanctions Hypocrisy,
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to punish Madagascar but failure to sanction Kenya whose unity government faced similar
problems).
355
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The following section sets forth the problems faced by the African Union
in light of its response to the crises in Zimbabwe, Libya, and Kenya. The
section further proposes additional concrete legal solutions to improve the
ability of the African Union to obtain member state compliance with the
African Charter and Constitutive Act.
VI. ADDITIONAL SOLUTIONS TO ENSURE STATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE
AFRICAN CHARTER AND CONSTITUTIVE ACT
From an institutionalist perspective, several norms established by the
African Charter and other governing instruments have stood as barriers to the
African Union’s success. Such limitations include claw-back clauses and the
principle of equitable regional representation and rotation. Moreover, from a
realist perspective, issues such as the limited political will of the African
Union and its member states, as well as the African Union’s failure to timely
and uniformly impose sanctions, have beset the organization since inception.
From an institutionalist and realist perspective, the potential solutions that
the African Union could implement to ensure member state compliance with
the African Charter and Constitutive Act, include revising the latter to
address budgetary issues, standards for the election of a chairman, the
frequency of Assembly meetings, and the timeliness of Assembly decision
making. Further, the organization could revise the African Charter to include
the right to vote, remove the claw-back clauses, and address certain concerns
regarding state reporting procedures. All of the above were discussed in
detail in Parts III.A and III.B of this Article. The following sections discuss
several additional solutions: (a) timely and uniformly imposing sanctions and
amending the Council Protocol to remove the principle of equitable regional
representation and rotation; (b) better utilization of the African Union
Commission on International Law; (c) more frequent utilization of the
provisional measures permitted by the African Commission’s rules of
procedure; and (d) providing individual and NGO access to the African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights.
A. Limited Political Will, Council Protocol, and Timely Sanctions
The African Union’s responses to the crises in Kenya, Libya, and
Zimbabwe indicate that the African Union has limited political will. The
African Union and its member states tend to only effectively intervene in
political crises involving countries with smaller populations and less political
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power, such as Madagascar and Guinea.356 In contrast, the African Union
and its member states have responded reluctantly, and with very little
success, to political turmoil occurring in larger, more powerful states such as
Libya and Kenya.357 Moreover, many of the current leaders of African states
have risen to power through undemocratic means and have been flagrant
human rights violators. In fact, as of 2008, only eighteen African countries
regularly elected their governments in free and open elections.358 As a result,
some member states have been reluctant to criticize other state leaders when
they violate the human rights and democratic principles set forth in the
African Charter and the Constitutive Act.359 The composition of the Peace
and Security Council evidences this problem.
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See Part IV of this Article for a discussion on the African Union’s response to the crises in
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World Factbook: Guinea, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.ogv/library/publicatio
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In 2010 the leaders of Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe, and Libya were
each elected to serve three years on the Peace and Security Council.360 The
Peace and Security Council is responsible for resolving political conflicts
and crises in member states.361 Additionally, pursuant to Article 7(g) of the
Council Protocol, the Peace and Security Council has the power to “institute
sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of Government takes place in
a member state.”362 The current and former leaders of Equatorial Guinea
(Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo), Zimbabwe (Mugabe), and Libya
(Gaddafi) each have a long record of noncompliance with the democratic and
human rights principles contained in the African Charter and Constitutive
Act. For example, President Mbasogo has controlled Equatorial Guinea
since 1979, and after Gaddafi’s death President Mbasogo is now referred to
as “Africa’s longest-serving ruler.”363 President Mbasogo has continued to
violate the freedom of expression and freedom of association principles
contained in the African Charter364 and has held sham referendums to keep
himself in power.365 Furthermore, evidence suggests that the citizens of
Equatorial Guinea are routinely arrested and detained without due process of
the law in violation of Article 6 of the African Charter.366 Despite the fact
that President Mbasogo has failed to hold free and fair democratic elections
and has continued to violate a number of the human rights and democratic
principles set forth in the African Charter and Constitutive Act, President
Mbasogo was elected to serve as the chairman and leader of the African
Union in January of 2011.367 This clearly undermines the African Union’s
commitment to democracy and the protection of human rights.
Similarly, as previously noted in Part V.A of this Article, President
Mugabe of Zimbabwe has controlled his country for almost thirty-two years,
though his many human rights abuses have been well documented. Thus, it
came as no surprise when President Mugabe supported Gaddafi, another
360
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flagrant human rights abuser, and condemned other African countries for
supporting NATO’s bombing of Libya.368 Furthermore, it appears that there
is no end in sight to President Mugabe’s reign in Zimbabwe since in January
of 2012, President Mugabe appeared before the African Union to request
support for his 2012 re-election campaign.369 The African Union is not the
only organization that has erred on occasion by providing support to
Mugabe. The UN recently appointed Mugabe as a tourism envoy.370
President Mbasogo, President Mugabe, and so many other African leaders
appear to be unwilling to hold recalcitrant leaders accountable for their
noncompliance with the human rights and democratic principles contained in
the African Charter and Constitutive Act, because they fear that they too will
be held accountable for their noncompliance. The failure of African leaders
to hold their counterparts accountable evidences the limited political will of
African leaders.
One potential solution to the problem of limited political will is to amend
the Council Protocol. Article 5, Section 2(g) of the Council Protocol
provides that the members of the Peace and Security Council are to be
elected with regard to a number of principles including respect for
constitutional governance, the rule of law, and human rights.371 In theory
then, states, such as Zimbabwe, Libya, and Equatorial Guinea, that continue
to violate the human rights and democratic principles set forth in the African
Charter and Constitutive Act should not be permitted to serve on the Peace
and Security Council. However, Article 5, Section 2 of the Council Protocol
also provides that in electing the members of the Peace and Security Council
the Assembly must apply the principle of equitable regional representation
and rotation.372 While this principle is not specifically defined in the Council
Protocol, it arguably requires that each African region be equally represented
on the Peace and Security Council for a certain number of years. At first
glance, the use of the principal of equitable regional representation appears
to be appropriate given the diversity and vastness of the African continent.
However, this principle may have contributed to the election of member
states, such as Zimbabwe and Libya, to the Peace and Security Council since
such states may regionally represent an area of Africa, though these states
368
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have clearly failed to respect the human rights and democratic principles
contained in the African Charter. In practice the principle of equitable
regional representation and rotation contained in Article 5, Section 2 of the
Council Protocol may trump the respect for human rights principles
contained in Article 5, Section 2(g). Therefore, it may be responsible for the
appointment of member states that have failed to respect human rights to the
Peace and Security Council that have failed to respect human rights. As
such, the Council Protocol should be amended to (1) remove references to
the principle of equitable regional representation and rotation from Article 5,
Section 2; and (2) clearly provide that a member state’s ability to serve on
the Peace and Security Council is conditioned upon acceptance by person the
chair of the Assembly upon review of the state’s record of compliance with
the human rights and democratic principles set forth in both the African
Charter and Constitutive Act.
Institutionalists posit that a human rights regime can encourage state
compliance with the norms established by the human rights regime by
rewarding states that comply with these norms and rules.373 Instead of
relying on the principle of equitable regional representation, the African
Union should reward states who comply with the norms and principles
established in the African Charter and Constitutive Act with leadership
positions on the Peace and Security Council. The Peace and Security
Council is an integral part of the African Union as well as the main organ
responsible for resolving political and humanitarian crises, and promoting
peace, security, and democracy in Africa.374 Moreover, Article 7 of the
Council Protocol provides that the Peace and Security Council has the power
to “institute sanctions [when] an unconstitutional change of Government”
occurs as defined in the Lome Declaration.375 Given the Peace and Security
Council’s important role in the African Union and its power to issue
sanctions, the Council should consist of unbiased member states that have a
strong record of protecting human rights and encouraging democracy. The
need for impartial and unbiased states to serve on the Peace and Security
Council is aptly evidenced by the problems the African Union faced in its
attempts to resolve the Libyan crisis. Libyan rebels refused to support the
African Union’s negotiation efforts as the African Union was seen as biased
in favor of Gaddafi, who represented Libya as a member of the Peace and
Security Council at the time of the uprising.376
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374
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376
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In a sign that the African Union might be ready to seriously promote
democracy, on January 29, 2012, the African Union selected President Yayi
Boni of Benin, an electoral democracy,377 to serve as the chairman of the
African Union.378 While President Yayi has been accused of corruption,
evidence suggests that his government has a decent track record of respecting
many of the human rights principles contained in the African Charter
including, but not limited to, freedom of expression.379 By replacing
President Mbasogo—who has a track record of human rights abuses—with
President Yayi, the African Union may be signaling that it is finally ready to
lead by example and be taken seriously. The African Union needs to ensure
that its leaders, particularly the chairman of the Assembly, and the member
states of its central organs respect and promote human rights as well as
democratic principles in their respective countries so that these leaders and
member states can serve as stellar examples for other African countries to
follow. Furthermore, countries such as South Africa and Benin that have a
history of holding free and fair democratic elections should openly support
and encourage democracies in countries such as Equatorial Guinea, where
President Mbasogo has ruled for the last thirty-three years.380
Another solution the African Union could implement to encourage state
compliance with the African Charter and Constitutive Act would be to timely
and uniformly impose sanctions against member states for human rights
violations. The limited political will of the African Union appears to be a
contributing factor for the African Union’s failure to impose sanctions in a
timely or uniformed manner. For example, there was a one-year delay in
imposing sanctions against Madagascar381 and an eleven-month delay in
imposing sanctions against Guinea.382 Additionally, as discussed in Part V of
this Article, the African Union failed to impose any sanctions against
Zimbabwe, Libya, or Kenya. The EU first placed sanctions on Zimbabwe in
2002383 and has recently renewed those sanctions384 despite the African
377

Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2011 – Benin, REFWORLD (May 12, 2011), http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,FREEHOU,,BEN,,4dcbf52234,0.html.
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President Thomas Yayi Boni Elected as Chairperson of the African Union 29-01-2012,
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, AFR. UNION (Jan. 29, 2012), http://au.int/en/summit/18thsummit/slid
es/president-thomas-yayi-boni-elected-chairperson-african-union-29-01-2012-addis-ab-0.
379
Freedom House, supra note 377.
380
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381
Barry Malone, African Union Imposes Sanctions on Madagascar, REUTERS (Mar. 17,
2010, 4:34 PM), http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE62G0M520100317.
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See Nick Tattersall, African Union Imposes Sanctions on Guinea Junta, REUTERS (Oct.
29, 2009, 6:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/29/idUSLT440627 (explaining
that sanctions were imposed in October of 2009 though the military takeover occurred in
December of the prior year).
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Council Common Position (EU) 2002/145/CFSP of 18 Feb. 2002, 2002 O.J. (L 50) 1.
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Union’s failure to issue sanctions against Zimbabwe. The political crises in
Madagascar and Zimbabwe both include a failure of each government to
respect the democratic principles set forth in the Constitutive Act and the
African Charter; however, the African Union has elected to sanction
Madagascar but not Zimbabwe.385 In fact, the African Union has requested
that the international community lift all sanctions against Zimbabwe.386
Similarly, in Guinea the African Union issued sanctions against Camara after
he refused to provide assurances that he would not run for re-election in the
scheduled presidential elections.387 However, the African Union allowed
Mugabe to retain his position as president and participate in future elections
despite his thirty-year reign in Zimbabwe.388 Rather than playing favorites
with countries such as Zimbabwe, the African Union needs to utilize a more
uniform approach when issuing sanctions. Furthermore, from a realist
perspective, imposing sanctions in a timely and consistent manner
encourages swifter compliance with international obligations, as they may
lead a state to conclude that noncompliance is not in the state’s financial
interest. Therefore, when the African Union fails to impose timely sanctions
in a uniform manner, it communicates to member states that the benefits of
noncompliance outweigh the costs of compliance and that there are no real
costs for failing to comply with the African Charter or the Constitutive Act.
Although there has been rigorous academic debate regarding the efficacy
of sanctions, recent discussions on this topic suggest that sanctions can be
effective at ensuring state compliance under certain conditions. For
example, sanctions may elicit state or leader compliance when the state or
leader has miscalculated the likelihood that sanctions will be imposed,
“underestimate[d] the impact of sanctions, or wrongly believe[d] that
sanctions will be imposed and maintained even if it yields.”389 Additionally,
sanctions that are imposed directly against a government or leader may cause

384

Council Decision 2012/97/CFSP, 2012 O.J. (L 47) 50.
See supra Part IV.B, Part V.A.
386
Assembly of the African Union Decision on Zimbabwe, ¶ 6, Doc.
Assembly/AU/Dec.219(XII) (Feb. 2009).
387
Communiqué 207th Meeting, supra note 176, ¶ 4, Doc. PSC/AHG/COMM.2(CCVII)
(Oct. 29, 2009); see also Agence France-Presse, Guinea: African Union Threatens Junta
Leader, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/19/world/Africa/19br
iefs-Guineabrf.html.
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See Statement by Kikwete, supra note 208 (stating that Mugabe was permitted to remain
in power); Robert Mugabe Insists on Re-election Bid in Zimbabwe, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16128774 (noting that Mugabe is seeking reelection despite taking control in 1980).
389
Jon Hovi et al., When Do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?, 57 WORLD POL. 479,
499 (2005).
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the government or leader to lose power.390 For instance, some argue the
economic sanctions that the United States imposed against Nicaragua’s
Sandinista National Liberation Front (Sandinista) in the 1980s led to the
defeat of the Sandinista candidate, Daniel Ortega, in the 1990 Nicaraguan
elections.391 Thus, a leader or government may be more likely to
compromise when sanctions threaten his or her position in office.392
Sanctions can also be effective when the target state or leader faces
significant domestic, political opposition.393 For example, the apartheid
regime in South Africa faced significant domestic opposition from the
African National Congress, and sanctions played an important role in the
elimination of this regime.394 In the African context, timely and uniformly
imposing sanctions may be an effective tool that enables the African Union
to ensure recalcitrant states comply with the human rights and democratic
provisions of the African Charter and Constitutive Act.
The conditions that may lead to the effective utilization of sanctions exist
in a number of African states. For example, in Madagascar, Rajoelina faced
domestic opposition from a faction of the military that demanded Rajoelina’s
resignation after he assumed power, and in May 2010 he faced a mutiny by
gendarmerie.395 Similarly, Mugabe faced domestic opposition from the MDC
in Zimbabwe,396 and in Guinea, Camara miscalculated the determination of
the African Union to impose sanctions when he insisted on participating in
future presidential elections over the African Union’s objections.397
390
Nikolay Marinov, Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?, 49 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 564, 565 (2005).
391
William M. Leogrande, Making the Economy Scream: US Economic Sanctions Against
Sandinista Nicaragua, 17 THIRD WORLD Q. 329, 343 (1996). Leogrande argues that the
United States “failed to achieve its . . . goal in Nicaragua—the ousting of the Sandinista
government by military force” via the Contra War; however, the economic sanctions imposed
on Nicaragua were far more effective at removing the Sandinistas from power, for the
following reasons: (a) “[t]he structure of Nicaragua’s underdeveloped economy made the
Sandinistas more vulnerable to economic than military pressure,” (b) “the USSR and its allies
were willing to provide Nicaragua with . . . military hardware to fight the contra war,” but
were unwilling to bear the financial burden of supporting the Nicaraguan economy, (c) the
“economic sanctions were undertaken in tandem with extensive paramilitary attacks,” and (d)
“the hardships imposed by Nicaragua’s economic collapse in 1988–89 . . . undermined the
Sandinistas base of popular support.” Id. at 343–44.
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Marinov, supra note 390, at 564.
393
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EFFECTIVENESS AS TOOLS OF FOREIGN POLICY 22–23 (1992).
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See generally HOW SANCTIONS WORK: LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA (Neta C. Crawford
& Audie Klotz eds., 1999) (containing various articles covering debates on the efficacy of
sanctions, both generally and in the context of South Africa’s democratic transition).
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Sanctions against recalcitrant African leaders and states “should be
graded according to the nature of the violation and the reason the state [or
leader] proffers for failing to comply.”398 Moreover, despite the debate
regarding the efficacy of sanctions, the prevalence of human rights abuses
and the lack of democracy in Africa suggest that the African Union has no
choice but to utilize all potential tools in its arsenal, including graded
sanctions, to ensure state compliance with the human rights and democratic
principles contained in the African Charter and Constitutive Act.
B. African Union Commission on International Law
The African Union established the African Union Commission on
International Law (AUCIL) at the Twelfth Ordinary Session of the Assembly
held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in February of 2009.399 Article 4 of the
Statute of the African Union Commission on International Law (AUCIL
Statute) sets forth the primary objectives of the AUCIL, including “to
undertake activities relating to codification and progressive development of
international law in the African continent.”400 There are striking similarities
between the AUCIL Statute and the Statute of the International Law
Commission (ILC) adopted in 1947 (ILC Statute).401 For example, Article 3,
Section 2 of the AUCIL Statute is exactly the same as Article 2, Section 2 of
the ILC Statute.402 Similarly, and most importantly, the main goal of the ILC
and AUCIL appears to be the same; Article 4(a) of the AUCIL contains
similar language as that found in Article 1 of the ILC Statute, which provides
that “[t]he International Law Commission shall have for its object the
promotion of the progressive development of international law and its
codification.”403 Thus, the African Union seemingly has modeled the AUCIL
after the widely successful ILC.

176 (granting permission to impose targeted sanctions on CNDD).
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See Laurence R. Hefler, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights:
Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19
EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 156 (2008).
399
Decision on the Draft Statute of the African Union Commission on International Law –
Doc.-Assembly/AU/12 (XII) –a, Doc. Assembly/AU//Dec.209(XII) (Feb. 2009).
400
Statute of the African Union Commission on International Law, art. 4(a), adopted Feb. 4,
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GAOR, 2d Sess., at 105, U.N. Doc. A/519 (Nov. 21, 1947) [hereinafter ILC Statute].
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ILC Statute, supra note 401, art. 1; see also AUCIL Statute, supra note 400 (undertaking
“activities relating to codification and progressive development”).
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Since its inception in 1947, the ILC has worked extensively in the field of
international law, meeting annually to review issues such as nationality and
statelessness and treaty law.404 The most important function of the ILC is the
drafting of articles and other documents on various aspects of international
law either upon request of the UN General Assembly, other U.N. organs, the
member states, or its own initiative.405 Upon completion of its work on a
topic, the ILC refers the final draft back to the UN General Assembly for it
to take action as deemed appropriate, normally including its
recommendations as to what measures should be adopted.406 The ILC is
responsible for authoring a number of documents central to international law.
Since its formulation of the Nuremberg principles at its first session in 1949,
the ILC has worked extensively in international criminal law.407 Among its
most prominent roles in that area was drafting the Statute for the
International Criminal Court in 1994.408 Other successes the ILC has enjoyed
include drafting the following documents: the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, the Vienna Convention on Succession of States, the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations,409 and the Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.410 As a result of
these successes, many have argued that there are, today, few domains of
international law to the development of which the ILC has not contributed in
some way.411

404
See generally A.E. Golieb, The International Law Commission, 4 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 64
(1966) (analyzing the relative disuse of judicial dispute resolution despite the quality of ILC
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Comm’n, 2d Sess., June 5–July 29, 1950, U.N. Doc. A/1316, available at http://untreaty.un.
org/ilc/documentation/English/a_cn4_34.pdf (discussing the formulation of the Nuremburg
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U.N. Doc. A/RES/488(V) (Dec. 12, 1950).
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Introduction, supra note 408.
411
See Christopher W. Pinto, The International Law Commission: Methods of Work and
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COMMISSION AT 50, at 233, 248–50, 252 (1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/books/M
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The African Union should be lauded for creating an organ that is modeled
after the very successful ILC. However, three years have passed since the
creation of the AUCIL, and very little action has been taken by the AUCIL
during that time period. The AUCIL website indicates that it has held only
three ordinary sessions, the most recent of which took place on March 21,
2011.412 In contrast, three years after the ILC was created it drafted the
Nuremberg Principles in 1950.413 The AUCIL amended its Rules of
Procedure during its Second Ordinary Session414 and, after its Third Ordinary
Session, developed the Report on the Inter-Sessional Activities of the
AUCIL Bureau, setting forth AUCIL activities between December 2011 and
March 2011.415 Though norm development is also the AUCIL’s main focus,
modeling its statute after the ILC Statute is only the first step in ensuring the
success of the AUCIL. The AUCIL has the potential to play a larger role in
achieving the African Union’s goal—ensuring state compliance with human
rights and democratic principles—but fails to do so because it is currently
underutilized.
From an institutionalist perspective, a regional human rights system can
obtain state compliance by clearly establishing unambiguous rules and norms
for states to follow.416 Thus, in order to replicate the ILC’s success, the
AUCIL must become more active in promoting and establishing clear norms
and rules for the African Union. Moreover, the AUCIL should be
instrumental in creating new methods, via drafting new instruments, to better
ensure member state compliance with the principles set forth in the African
Charter and Constitutive Act.
The AUCIL should also play an instrumental role in providing guidance
to the African Union on interpreting and implementing those norms already
contained in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
(Democratic Charter).417 The Democratic Charter was adopted on January
412
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(2011).
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417
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the peaceful resolution of conflicts, respect for the Union and recourse to its
[o]rgans, when necessary.
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30, 2007,418 and it requires, among other things, that member states commit
themselves to the promotion of democracy and human rights.419 Article 48 of
the Democratic Charter provides that the charter will become effective only
after fifteen member states have ratified the charter.420 The Democratic
Charter entered into force on February 15, 2012.421 To date, the following
fifteen member states have ratified the Democratic Charter: Mauritania,
Rwanda, Guinea, Ethiopia, Chad, Niger, Sierra Leone, Ghana, GuineaBissau, Burkina Faso, South Africa, Nigeria, Lesotho, Zambia, and
Cameroon.422 The newly effective Democratic Charter has been referred to
as “one of the most progressive legal instruments” that has been adopted by
the African Union .423 Other African states have been unwilling to express
support for the Democratic Charter, arguably because of the Charter’s
expansive provisions on the promotion of democracy,424 but also because
these states have not placed a high priority on ratification.425 For example,
Article 23, Section 5 of the Democratic Charter provides that an
unconstitutional change of government includes “any amendment . . . to the
constitution or legal instruments” of a member state, which “infringe[s] on
the principles of democratic change of government.”426 Many African heads
of state have amended the constitutions of their respective countries to keep
themselves in power.427 Thus, given the Democratic Charter’s expansive
provisions regarding democratic and human rights, this charter has the
potential to further promote democracy and decrease unconstitutional
changes of government in African states. The AUCIL Statute provides that
the AUCIL is responsible for the codification of international law and should
prepare studies on international law in areas that have not been substantially
AUCIL Statute, art.4(e) supra note 400.
418
Ratification Status of Democratic Charter, supra note 125.
419
Democratic Charter, supra note 100, art. 2.
420
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sa.org.za/EISA/aucharter.htm (last updated Feb. 12, 2012) (listing the instrument’s status as
ratified).
422
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423
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developed by member states of the African Union.428 The Democratic
Charter has only recently entered into force. As such, the AUCIL should
utilize its topic selection power to push the Democratic Charter to the
forefront of the African Union’s agenda and obtain ratification and
codification of the Democratic Charter by all member states. The AUCIL
should provide guidance to the African Union on how to interpret and apply
the norms contained the Democratic Charter. Moreover, pursuant to Article
8 of the AUCIL Statute, the AUCIL has the power to propose revisions to
legal instruments adopted by the African Union.429 The AUCIL should
actively utilize this power to propose revisions to the legal instruments of the
African Union so as to better aid the African Union in protecting human
rights and promoting democracy on the African continent.
C. Provisional Measures
The African Union can also encourage state compliance with the African
Charter and Constitutive Act by more frequently and effectively utilizing
provisional measures. The Rules of Procedure of the African Commission
permits the African Commission, prior to rendering a final decision on a
communication, to recommend provisional measures that should be taken by
a member state to avoid irreparable harm to individuals (Original Provisional
Measures Rule).430 The Rules of Procedure of the African Commission were
amended in 2010 and the provisional measures rule that was previously
located in Rule 111 has now been codified in Rule 98 of the revised Rules of
Procedure (Revised Provisional Measures Rule).431 In contrast to the
language contained in the Original Provisional Measures Rule, that of the
Revised Provisional Measures Rule not only grants the African Commission
power to recommend provisional measures independently, but also grants the
parties to a petition rights to request that the African Commission issue
provisional measures.432 The Revised Provisional Measures Rule also
explicitly requires the African Commission to send a copy of the request for
provisional measures to the Assembly of the African Union and the Peace
and Security Council, and establishes a fifteen-day period within which the
offending state must report back to the African Commission on the
428

AUCIL Statute, supra note 400, arts. 5(1), 6.
Id. art. 8.
430
RULES OF PROC. OF THE AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS., r. 111(1)–(2) (1995)
(amended 2010), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/Africa/rules.thm.
431
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implementation of the requested provisional measures.433 Additionally, the
provisional measures rule gives the chairperson of the African Commission
the power to take provisional measures when the African Commission is not
in session.434
One example of the application of the provisional measures rule and its
effectiveness in avoiding human rights violations—by ensuring state
compliance with the human rights guaranteed by the African Charter—is the
case of Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria.435 In this case, an NGO
submitted a petition to the African Commission on behalf of Zamani
Lekwot—a former army general in Nigeria—and a number of other
individuals sentenced to death by a special tribunal in Nigeria.436 The
petition alleged that counsel for the defendants was routinely harassed during
the trial and eventually forced to withdraw as a result.437 The holdings and
decisions of these special tribunals, which were composed of armed forces,
police, and judges, were not subject to appeal under Nigerian law.438 The
petition submitted on behalf of the defendants alleged several violations of
the African Charter: first, that the lack of judicial appeals for judgments
rendered by the special tribunal violated Article 7, Section 1(a)’s right to
appeal decisions before a competent national organ; second, that the
harassment and deprivation of defense counsel violated Article 7, Section
1(c)’s right to defense counsel of one’s choice; and finally, that the
composition of the special tribunals violated an individual’s Article 7,
Section 1(d) right to be tried by an impartial tribunal.439 The African
Commission utilized its provisional measures power by requesting that the
Nigerian government stay execution until the African Commission
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435
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the tribunal chairman record his cross examination of a particular witness.
AFR. WATCH, NIGERIA: THREATS TO A NEW DEMOCRACY: HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS AT
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completed its review of the defendants’ petition.440 The Lagos High Court
eventually issued an injunction that stayed the execution of the defendants.441
Upon its final review of the petition, the African Commission held that
Nigeria had violated Article 7 of the African Charter and reasoned, among
other things, that the special tribunal’s composition—primarily of persons
from the executive branch of government, who passed the Civil Disturbances
Act that created the tribunals—lacked the sufficient appearance of
impartiality at the very least.442 According to the African Commission, the
Civil Disturbances Act rendered the decisions of the special tribunals nonappealable, and
while punishments decreed as the culmination of a carefully
conducted criminal procedure do not necessarily constitute
violations of [the right to life and liberty], to foreclose any
avenue of appeal to “competent national organs” in criminal
cases bearing such penalties clearly violates Article 7.1(a) of
the African Charter, and increases the risk that even severe
violations may go unredressed.443
Despite Nigeria’s domestic laws, the death sentences were eventually
reduced to five years imprisonment.444
The Constitutional Rights Project clearly illustrates that the provisional
measures rule can be successfully used to protect human rights in Africa,
mainly the respect for life principle referenced in Article 4 of the African
Charter. Provisional measures may be especially useful when the life or
physical well-being of an individual is at risk. However, the provisional
measures rule is greatly underutilized by the African Commission, which has
been reluctant to apply these measures to prevent individual human rights
violations.445 The ability to intervene and enact protective provisions before
rendering a final decision can protect African citizens from grave physical
harm and even death, which under certain circumstances may violate the
rights to life and liberty guaranteed by Articles 4 and 6 of the African
Charter as seen in the Nigeria Case.446 The need for more frequent utilization
of the provisional measures rule is evident. For example, in February of
440
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2011, Mugabe’s government arrested, detained, and tortured individuals who
were watching videos of the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, and charged
these individuals with plotting to overthrow Mugabe’s government.447 The
actions of Mugabe’s government were clearly in violation of a number of
human rights principles guaranteed by the African Charter including, but not
limited to, the Article 5 right to be free from torture and inhumane
punishment.448 Moreover, at the time of this writing, a number of the
individuals accused of plotting to overthrow Mugabe in an Egyptian or
Tunisian style revolt are being tried in Zimbabwe.449
Of course, utilization of the provisional measures rule is not without
problems, and there have been cases where the African Union’s attempt to
utilize the rule has failed. For example, in 1994, the African Union
attempted to use the provisional measures rule to intervene in another
Nigerian case, involving Kenule Beeson Saro-Wiwa Jr. (Ken Saro Case).450
Saro-Wiwa was a writer and activist, as well as the president of the
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People.451 Saro-Wiwa and a number
of other defendants were arrested and charged with murdering four Ogoni
leaders.452 The Nigerian government ignored the African Union’s repeated
requests to stay the execution of the defendants in the Ken Saro Case and all
defendants were eventually executed.453 Similarly, in Zegveld v. Eritrea, the
African Commission concluded that Eritrea had violated Articles 2, 6, 7(1),
and 9(2) of the African Charter when it detained eleven former government
officials for criticizing the government.454 The African Commission
requested that Eritrea release the prisoners.455 However, as of this writing,
Eritrea has failed to release any of the prisoners and five of the eleven
prisons are presumed dead.456
447
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Arguably, the provisional measures rule allows the African Union to
protect individual citizens and ensure that member states take steps to extend
human and democratic rights to citizens. While there have been a number of
cases in which the use of the provisional measures rule was not successful,457
the Nigeria Case illustrates that the provisional measures rule exemplifies a
preexisting program or mechanism that the African Union could use more
effectively and frequently to prevent human rights violations in Africa and
ensure state compliance with the African Charter. Thus, the African Union
should publicize and signal its commitment to more quickly and effectively
utilize the provisional measures rule by encouraging individuals, member
states, and NGOs to submit communications and petitions to the African
Commission whenever human rights are being violated.
Additionally, Rule 93 of the Rules and Procedures of the African
Commission requires that all available local remedies be utilized and
exhausted prior to the African Commission’s review of a communication or
petition,458 and Article 56, Section 5 of the African Charter provides that
communications relating to human rights must be considered by the African
Commission “after [exhaustion of all] local remedies . . . unless it is obvious
that this procedure is unduly prolonged.”459 Yet, in some instances the
African Commission may need to respond to communications and petitions
by utilizing its provisional measures power to stop human rights violations
before local remedies have been exhausted. Moreover, given the paltry
human rights track record of a number of member states, local remedies are
unlikely to be impartial, timely, or effective.460 Thus, Commission Rule 93
and Article 56, Section 5 of the African Charter should be revised to permit
the African Commission to review communications and petitions prior to
exhaustion of local remedies in grave circumstances.
It should be noted that the African Commission has held that it “does not
believe that the condition [requiring local remedies to be] exhausted can be
applied literally to those cases in which it is ‘neither practicable nor
desirable’ for the . . . victims to pursue such” local remedies.461 Additionally,
in 2010 the rules of procedure were amended to provide that, if local
remedies have not been exhausted, an individual must provide and allege
specific grounds that support the contention that domestic remedies are
4f8f5339a23f7cd35dec247f932b&suid=6.
457
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impossible or unavailable.462 However, the existence of the exhaustion-oflocal-remedies requirement in Article 56 of the African Charter and in the
Rules of Procedure of the African Commission may deter individual African
citizens from submitting communications that evidence human rights
violations to the African Commission. Furthermore, and most importantly,
the African Union must terminate its practice of belatedly adopting
prophylactic measures in an attempt to correct inadequately drafted
governing documents.
Institutionalists contend that human rights violations occur when a human
rights regime is unable to provide unambiguous norms and rules for its
member states to follow.463 As such, the African Union must clearly
communicate its position on the exhaustion of local remedies, and the best
way to do so is by amending the African Charter and Rule 93. Thus, Article
56, Section 5 of the African Charter and Rule 93 should be revised by
defining circumstances in which the Commission may intervene prior to
exhaustion of local remedies. From a realist perspective, and in order to
ensure that states comply with the African Commission’s provisional
measures recommendations, the Assembly should be prepared to issue
sanctions in grave circumstances against recalcitrant member states that fail
to comply with these recommendations (although African Commission
recommendations may be nonbinding on member states).464
D. Individual and NGO Access to the African Court
In an effort to ensure the development of a cohesive human rights
jurisprudence in Africa, the African Union adopted The Protocol on the
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Court Protocol) in
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2008.465 The Court Protocol merged the African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (Human Rights Court) and the Court of Justice of the
African Union to establish the African Court of Justice and Human Rights
(African Court).466 The Court Protocol will come into effect after fifteen
states have ratified the protocol.467 As of August 6, 2010, Libya, Burkina
Faso, and Mali were the only African states to have ratified the Court
Protocol.468 Until the Court Protocol becomes effective, the Human Rights
Court is the adjudicatory body responsible for hearing cases involving
violations of the African Charter.469
Article 30(f) through Article 8(3) of the Court Protocol require that
member states make a declaration accepting the African Court in order for
court to hear a complaint from an individual or NGO.470 Thus, unless a state
makes this declaration the African Court has no jurisdiction to hear a case
brought by an individual or an NGO. A similar declaration must be made by
member states under the protocol establishing the Human Rights Court.471
To date, only the following five countries have made the special declaration
permitting individual and NGO access to the Human Rights Court: Burkina
Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, and Mali.472 Given that only five member
states have made special declarations under the protocol establishing the
Human Rights Court, which was established in 1998 and entered into force
in 2004,473 member states are unlikely to make the declaration necessary to
465
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permit individual and NGO access to the African Court once the African
Court becomes effective. The importance of obtaining individual and NGO
access to a regional human rights court has been well documented.474 From
an institutionalist perspective, NGOs and individuals often times play a
crucial role in monitoring state compliance with human rights norms by
bringing human rights violations to the attention of the applicable human
rights regime, thereby permitting a human rights regime to hold abusive
states accountable for violations of human rights, especially when the state is
unwilling to acknowledge or address its own violations.475
Moreover, institutionalists posit that state compliance with the norms of a
human rights regime will be greatest in regions where the human rights
regimes are strong, for example, the EU system. Further, institutionalists
assert that state compliance may be obtained by increasing the cost of
cheating and creating greater interdependence among states.476 The provision
of the Court Protocol that prevents individual and NGO access to the African
Court is contrary to the approach taken by the European Court of Human
Rights, which granted individuals the ability to have direct access to the
court in 1998.477 Individual access to the European Court of Human Rights
has arguably increased the ability of the Council of Europe to hold
noncompliant states accountable and ensure the protection of human rights.
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In fact, Laurence Hefler has argued that “the individual complaints
mechanism of the [European Court of Human Rights] is the crown jewel of
the world’s most advanced international system for protecting civil and
political liberties.478
From an institutionalist perspective, allowing
individuals and NGOs unfettered access to file complaints before the African
Court would provide additional protection against state sanctioned human
rights violations. Further, unfettered access would improve the ability of the
African Union to hold member states accountable for violations of the human
rights and democratic principles contained in the African Charter and
Constitutive Act, thereby increasing the cost of cheating. As such, the Court
Protocol should be revised to eliminate the need for a special state
declaration authorizing individual and NGO access to the African Court.
Additionally, since the Court Protocol has not yet entered into force, the
Human Rights Court is the adjudicatory body that is currently responsible for
hearing cases related to violations of the rights contained in the African
Charter.479 As previously mentioned, the protocol establishing the Human
Rights Court also requires a special state declaration to permit individual and
NGO access to the court.480 Therefore, in order to allow individual and NGO
access to the currently operational Human Rights Court, the protocol
establishing the Human Rights Court should be amended to remove the
requirement for a special declaration by member states.
VII. CONCLUSION
While the OAU fulfilled its goal of eradicating colonialism in Africa and
apartheid in South Africa, it failed to provide adequate human rights
protections to African peoples. The African Union is attempting to succeed
where the OAU has failed. From both an institutionalist and realist
perspective, the African Union has achieved success in resolving political
crises and ensuring state compliance with the African Charter and
Constitutive Act in smaller countries such as Guinea. Unfortunately, the
African Union’s feeble and ineffective response to the political and
humanitarian crises in Zimbabwe, Libya, and Kenya indicates that the
African Union still has a long way to go in order to provide regional human
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rights protection and obtain member state compliance with the African
Charter and Constitutive Act.
Recent events in a number of African countries indicate that the African
Union will need to address the many problems and issues outlined in this
Article—including limited exercise of political will, failure to timely and
uniformly impose sanctions, state reporting failures, and inadequately drafted
governing instruments—in order to effectively resolve new and ongoing
crises. For example, Guinea-Bissau averted an attempted coup on December
26, 2011; however, President Malam Bacai Sanha died of natural causes in a
Paris clinic in January of 2012.481 Guinea-Bissau eventually suffered another
military coup in April 2012.482 Similarly, the situation in Madagascar is
ongoing. As recently as January 21, 2012, and in violation of the political
roadmap that was executed to resolve the crisis, Rajoelina prevented former
president Ravalomanana’s return to Madagascar.483 On June 14, 2012,
Rajoelina finally agreed to meet with Ravalomanana to address unresolved
issues in the hopes of putting an end to the ongoing crisis.484
The African Union’s ability to effectively resolve current crises by
ensuring that these countries not only comply with all applicable peace
agreements, but also comply with the African Charter and Constitutive Act,
remains to be seen. One thing is clear, however: if the African Union intends
to succeed where the OAU has failed, it must adequately address its efficacy
issues so that it can obtain member state compliance with the human rights
and democratic principles set forth in the African Charter and Constitutive
Act.
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